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This article/book review says that summits tend not to work, despite the hope behind them:
...Reynolds sets out an analytical structure, considers six important summit meetings between 1938 and 1985, and concludes that only one of them had the desired result. The history of the political summit ? truly a triumph of hope over experience ? arises from the conviction of leaders that if only they can meet face to face with their opposite number, something can be worked out: charm will triumph. And time after time, the result was, at worst, disaster ? as at Munich in 1938 ? but more frequently the unravelling of hopes.
The history of the political summitThis is interesting, as one would think the nature of the summit to be something which is conducive to the realization of diplomacy. So why the failure? Is it ultimately dependent on the precise particulars of any given geo-political situation? Or is there a theme for the failures or (the lone) success?
Far too many disparate issuses abound at any so called “global summit”. The largest miracle is that these pompus politicians agreed to meet in the first place. Their failure to accomplish much should not alarm us. What should alarm us? Good question.
I'm not so sure this guy is being fair. One thing I always thought, and will probably never know, was how many crises was diverted because of these summits. How many wars or conflicts were prevented or the severity lessened?Yes, Chamberlain was an idiot (IMO), but why does the author just fault him? All of Europe was ignoring the growing threat of Hitler, and none of them wanted another war, so that may be why they let Germany get away with what they did prior to WWII (Czechoslovakia, Rhineland)Interestingly, there's another article/book review from that same web page about how members of the Blair administration made peace with Northern Ireland.Making Peace in Northern Ireland by Jonathan Powell
One thing that may need to be considered (which is brought up in the book review) is that there's a distinction between a “summit” and a “non-summit” meeting. I think the former is with two opposing global powers, whereas the latter can be with allies. I'm wondering if the Tony Blair peace with N. Ireland would not be considered a “summit”….though evidently it seems to have been conducive to peace, and therefore success.It's an historical "what if" in regards to how many catastrophes have been averted because of summits. I think the author is just going with what effects he can observe after the fact. I bet there are intangibles, however, such as the effect they have on the citizens of those nations that reconciliation and diplomacy is a top priority.
One thing that may need to be considered (which is brought up in the book review) is that there's a distinction between a "summit" and a "non-summit" meeting.
Are you referring to where he is defining institutionalised summitry?
And now there is what Reynolds calls ?institutionalised summitry?, in which groups of national leaders meet at regular intervals backed up by a huge bureaucratic infrastructure. It has replaced ?classical summitry? largely because the world and its problems have changed substantially since the end of the Cold War.
I wonder if this book is available in the US. It would be interesting to read and discuss it together.
