I'm wondering if Germany really would have been able to defeat the Soviet Union, or if it was more like a crap shoot from the beginning for Hitler. Did Hitler underestimate the USSR completely? For example, had he been able to take Moscow, would he still have failed in taking the rest of the Soviet Union?
I'd say Hitler was euphoric about his stunning victories at the beginning of WWII : the Anschluss, Czechoslovakia, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Poland, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and soon England so that he might have felt that overwhelming Russia wasn't such a big deal, not to talk about Hitler's need of raw materials and the prospective of a swift victoryHowever Hitler totally disregarded Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812, starting an ill-considered attack
I'd say Hitler was euphoric about his stunning victories at the beginning of WWII : the Anschluss, Czechoslovakia, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Poland, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and soon England so that he might have felt that overwhelming Russia wasn't such a big deal, not to talk about Hitler's need of raw materials and the prospective of a swift victoryHowever Hitler totally disregarded Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812, starting an ill-considered attack
Hitler was affected by what some historians have called the ?victory disease?. Given his record up to that point, he had been extremely successful in almost everything that he had attempted (with the exception of the Battle of Britain ? and many historians agree that Hitler?s goal had been a separate peace with Great Britain, not an invasion to conquer Britain).So, consider Hitler?s position:- No one had been able to resist his land army.- Stalin had purged the leadership of the Red Army and it appeared to be a shambles.- The Finns had given the Red Army all it could handle in December 1939 and January 1940 (but conveniently forgotten is that the Red Army got its act together in February).- There were indicators that ?the whole rotten house? would indeed collapse if pressured.- German activities along the Soviet border in May and June 1941 indicated that the Soviets were grossly unprepared to face a German invasion.Was victory possible? With our advantage of 20/20 hindsight, it may well have been so. Was Hitler on the verge of victory outside of Moscow? No ? he had committed key mistakes that allowed the Soviets to survive for the long haul. He had not effectively isolated the Soviet Union diplomatically. He capitalize on the advantages that strategic bombing could have brought ? and allowed the evacuation of Soviet factories. And perhaps most importantly, he grossly underestimated the ability of the Soviets to mobilize their forces ? they set out to destroy the Red Army but had no concept of how large that army was, nor how large it could become.
Hitler was affected by what some historians have called the ?victory disease?.
So it sounds like what you are saying, and what Aetheling/Wally also supported, was that there was an element of ego involved (though that word might not be terribly precise). Overconfidence? The invasion seems to have been an awfully big fight to pick given the size of the Soviet Union, both in population and terrain.BTW, thank you for the other bullet points you provided. They are quite helpful.
Had the Russians tried to go toe to toe with the Wehrmacht in the beginning without strategically falling back, they would have been overwhelmed (which they were anyway to a certain extent). But the Russians weren't stupid, they needed time to re-organize their forces and infrastructure behind the Ural Mountains, and the siege of Stalingrad and the Russian Winter afforded that time.
Ego might be the term, but I think “hubris” fits better…Hitler had focused on eastward expansion for Germany since Mein Kampf - so it really shouldn't have been a surprise to anyone. Great Britain had an edge on Hitler's invasion plans through ULTRA intercepts and they gently "nudged" Stalin to be on alert for German aggression - but Stalin (paranoid as ever, especially where Churchill was involved) thought that Great Britain was trying to provoke him into initiating the conflict with Hitler. Not wanting to even give a shadow of a hint that they had ULTRA, the British were reluctant to push the issue. Of course, I believe that Stalin was getting corroborating evidence through the Lucy spy network, but chose to ignore it too, along with all the reports from the frontier listing German preparations (the Germans claimed 1) the forces being built up were there in preparation for an invasion of Great Britain, and were here on the frontier to be out of range of the British bombers, and 2) that their positions were strictly defensive - but as the Soviet frontier forces reported, there was no barbed wire in front of the German positions and German reconnaissance flights - and later foot patrols - continually invaded Soviet territory). So, another great question here is why was Stalin so adamant to not see the threat of the impending German invasion?Just my personal interpretation of your original question - I think that Hitler had been thrown off track by the British response to the fall of France. He had expected Britain to accept a separate peace with Germany - not to resist at all costs. I don't think he intended to ever see the British Empire fall - that would have created a vaccuum that would have benefited all of the other powers, but not Germany - he needed Britain, if not as an ally, at least as a balance on the world power scene. When Great Britain did not seek / accept terms after the fall of France, I don't think Hitler new how to proceed - it was his temper that drove him to start bombing Great Britain and to start planning SEALION. Every other operation up until that point had followed a pretty specific pattern - diplomatic isolation, economic and political pressure, and the imposition of German troops -- by force or by threat of force. Everything had been carefully planned up until that point. I think that some of his timing and rashness in launching BARBAROSSA when he did might have been aimed at isolating Britain -- if the Soviet Union were knocked out of Europe (and maintained only a greatly weakened Asian position) - then perhaps Britain would be further isolated and more receptive to accepting a separate peace. In actuality, it is highly unlikely that Britain ever would, as German expansion into the Middle East, Bessarabia, and Greece would continue to drive conflict with the interests of the British Empire - but I don't think anyone ever accused Adolf Hitler of thinking clearly and rationally after 1940.
Had the Russians tried to go toe to toe with the Wehrmacht in the beginning without strategically falling back, they would have been overwhelmed (which they were anyway to a certain extent). But the Russians weren't stupid, they needed time to re-organize their forces and infrastructure behind the Ural Mountains, and the siege of Stalingrad and the Russian Winter afforded that time.
Russian defensive strategy has always been about trading territory for time. Confirming that Japan was not going to be a threat to their eastern frontiers in late 1941, the Soviets were able to accelerate mobilization by bringing in eastern divisions just in time to counterattack the Germans outside of Moscow, and we all know how that turned out.From what I have found in my studies, the Germans had no conception of the number of divisions that the Soviets would be able to field once they started to mobilize.
Vulture,I can't plus one all your posts here but your analysis so far fits in almost exactly with mine. In large measure Stalin got lucky that Hitler did not sustain the drive on Moscow. Hitler and the Wehrmacht wasted vital campaigning time driving south around Kiev and in Fighting in the Yelnya Pocket that could have been fruitfully used to drive on and capture Moscow. I am convinced that if Hitler had locked up Moscow that first year Russia might have fallen. Moscow was and is THE key city in Russia something like 90% of the Russian transportation net runs through there, that alone makes it a key target. Capture Moscow and you literally cut Russia in two, which lets you defeat the enemy in detail. Hitler made many mistakes but that was his second, his first was invading in the first place. The Wehrmacht might have defeated Russia, but they needed a lot of luck and a good commander, they were missing one of those vital elements and it was not luck at least in a tactical sense.
Vulture 6–excellent post–concise, complete and a pleasure to read–thank you.WillyDP.S. There is a thesis floating bout that the key to ALL of Hitler's actions was that he was, at heart, alazy bohemian artist. I do not remember to book that posited this, but I do recall that at the time itmade a lot of sense. I was always open to theories that countered Alan Bullock.
I just saw this article about the Soviet commander, whose remarks were recently unveiled about the lack of readiness by the USSR in the face of the German invasion.
"It would have been possible to contain the initial units of the opponent but if he quickly sent in his main group, he would have been difficult to stop," he told the interviewer, the Soviet writer Konstantin Simonov.
One of the things that saved Stalin from defeat in 1941 was his continually throwing units at the Germans and his series of “fight to the death” type orders. It takes time to defeat and corral even incompetent units and time is the one commodity that the Germans absolutely lacked. He kicked off the attack almost six weeks late because of both the Invasion of Greece and a longer than usual spring rasputitsa in and around the Pripet Marshes.
I'm wondering if Germany really would have been able to defeat the Soviet Union, or if it was more like a crap shoot from the beginning for Hitler. Did Hitler underestimate the USSR completely? For example, had he been able to take Moscow, would he still have failed in taking the rest of the Soviet Union?