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On 12 January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave his famous Aleutians speech at the National Press Club, Washington, DC. Acheson said that United States would adhere to the principle of non-interference with respect to the Chinese question and that the American defense line in the Pacific was one that connected Alaska, the Japanese archipelago, Okinawa, and the Philippines. He said the US Pacific “defense line” or “defensive perimeter” “runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes back to the Ryukyus…. We hold important positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and these we will continue to hold… The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands,” he said. This — Acheson tried to explain much later — was no more than what the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and Gen. Douglas McArthur held at the time, “that the U.S. line of defense starts from the Philippines and continues through the Ryukyu Archipelago, which includes its main bastion, Okinawa. Then it bends back through Japan and the Aleutian Island chain to Alaska.” But just because he did not include South Korea as part of his “defensive perimeter,” it was said later on that such omission had served to give the communists “the green light” to try to overrun Korea.Is there any interest or purpose in discussing this topic? Note: I drive a Kia Forte
So do you think our foreign policy/military doctrine (or in this case a lack of or ambiguity) provoked the Korean War? Or did the North Korean army pouring into South Korea have anything to do with it? I vote the latter.
So do you think our foreign policy/military doctrine (or in this case a lack of or ambiguity) provoked the Korean War? Or did the North Korean army pouring into South Korea have anything to do with it? I vote the latter.
So would the troops led by Brad Smith.
So do you think our foreign policy/military doctrine (or in this case a lack of or ambiguity) provoked the Korean War? Or did the North Korean army pouring into South Korea have anything to do with it? I vote the latter.
So would the troops led by Brad Smith.
Not at all. I merely suggested that the Sec. of State's remarks may have emboldened the North Koreanforces to move south more rapidly than planned and do so with the belief that America was not committedto the arrangement made at the end of WWII. It was posed as a question, not an opinion and I had hoped that it might engender a spirited discussion of that invasion. Many people are unaware of "the speech" which did not "provoke" the war--merely hastened it in my opinion. Never mind. I have been posting too frequently and a hiatus is in order. I shall listen more, speak less and perhaps grow in wisdom.
This argument is very similar to why Saddam invaded Kuwait thinking we didn't care. I suppose it's possible that the North Koreans miscalculated by thinking we wouldn't get involved, but I also suspect it's more complicated than this.
.... I merely suggested that the Sec. of State's remarks may have emboldened the North Koreanforces to move south more rapidly than planned and do so with the belief that America was not committedto the arrangement made at the end of WWII. ....
In his book, This Kind of War, T. R. Fehrenbach gives us this."On 12 January 1950 Secretary of state Acheson spoke to the National Press Club in Washington. During the speech it came to public light that neither Korea nor Taiwan were within the United States' security cordon in the Far East. This was nothing new. The Korean decision had been made prior to 17 September 1947, when the United States had informed Russia of its intention to place the Korean problem before the United Nations. And the United States was still cautiously waiting for the 'dust to settle' on the Chinese question." pg. 32.IMHO the main miscalculation was ours but had more to do with the type of war we expected; we were contemplating a global war for which we held most all the cards (bombs), not the type of war Korea became (hence the title of the book). We never have thought of war as a political tool while most of the rest of the world accepts this as a given and in Fehrenbach's words on our position at the time, "... it [the US] had a look history of looking the other way if not immediately threatened." Was this what you were looking for?I recommend the book quoted, highly.
Okay I guess I will formerly jump in here (though I tried not to). ;DWe got involved in Korea because Truman and his cabinet were berated for " losing China." Truman didn't want Korea added to his baggage so he moved to prove a point that he was capable of checking the spread of communism. The communists may have felt emboldened because of the American inability to save Chiang Kai Shek's Nationals. They probably also calculated that Americans were still war weary from World War II and too busy reconstructing Japan and the Philippines to bother with Korea. Much of this, however, is conjecture and compartmentalizing things so historians can neatly package this era of history. Take it for what it's worth.
