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Rundstedt saw the possibilities of the allied landings as clearly as Rommel did. Neither, however, had the courage of their convictions and neither was willing to buck the Fuerher by making common sense deployments. That being said, I think the only thing that could have really been done differently in Normandy is if the German reserves had been released earlier.Like I said, Rommel was an operational genius an an outstanding Corps commander but that is probably all he should have been was a Corps commander. He was out of his depth in command of a field army. His frequent bouts of nervous ulcers and breakdowns attest to his unfitness for command of a field army. His presence may have made a difference at El Alamein but he was in Germany relaxing after a nervous breakdown when the most severe test of his career happened. Of course he rushed to the battlefield but by the time he arrived the Axis postion in North Africa was fatally compromised.
Rommel ran out of Petrol and the Afrika Korps were doomed as a result. Not really his fault IMHO. But as a I said in another thread, the North Africa campaign was just a sideshow and the Allies and Germans both knew it.
He was bright enough to see through the Allied maneuvers leading up to D-Day, but Hitler refused to hear him and forced him to concentrate his efforts in Chalais instead of Normandy where Rommel implored his Fuehrer to reinforce.
By 1944, Hitler was quite used to ignoring his field commanders. Rommel was but one of many who recommended what would have been the "right" course of action militarily only to be overruled by the Fuhrer.
Looks like this tread is sliding off the original topic, so I think I?ll push it a little further?When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 he was confident that he could knock Stalin out of the war by the end of the year. His reasons for launching BARBAROSSA were many, but they included ?living space? for his expanding Reich ? that is for the German people; a ?pre-emptive? strike against future Soviet aggression; increased farm land and natural resources; and an attempt to drive Great Britain to seek peace terms.This last point is worthy of additional discussion ? Hitler was frustrated that Churchill had refused to seek terms. Operation SEALION was never a serious option. Hitler didn?t want to conquer Great Britain, but to seek terms so that he could focus his military and economic power elsewhere. If Britain were defeated, then their empire would collapse and be easy pickings for Hitler?s main rivals. No doubt the Soviets would move through Persia and Iraq and India. Japan would fill the British vacuum in the South Pacific and Burma (they ended up taking most of it ? including Singapore) the following year anyway. Thus, Hitler would have little to gain from the collapse of the British Empire and much to lose. In 1941 Churchill?s only ally capable of spoiling Hitler?s plans was the Soviet Union. He believed that a quick victory would convince Churchill to seek terms as the ?lesser? presence in Europe.With that setting, Hitler launched BARBAROSSA in June 1941 with his best and brightest. When they fell out of favor, such as with Guderian in December 1941, they were relieved and sent back to Germany.As far as Hitler remaining primarily focused on the Eastern Front ? this is no doubt due to a couple of reasons, not the least of which is the scale of the front and the scale of the threat. Other things to consider:- The campaigns of 1941-42 in Russia had been a war of annihilation. While the Ukranians may have seen the Germans initially as liberators from the Godless Soviets, Hitler wanted nothing to do with the Slavs. They were treated brutally, relocated, or annihilated. - In 1944-45, the advancing Soviets were returning the favor. As mentioned before, defeat at the hands of the Soviets would be brutal and/or fatal. Defeat at the hands of the British or Americans (or more properly, the Western Allies) promised more human treatment (usually).- In the summer of 1941, Hitler had moved his field headquarters to be closer to the Soviet front. His trips back to Berlin were infrequent and of relatively short duration, especially after he took over a commander in chief.- Strategic bombers flying from Great Britain were taking quite a heavy toll on German industry and communications. It was ?easier? to slow the Soviets and hold them back than it was to slow the aerial onslaught from airfields in England.
