The following is an analysis of Operation Barbarossa I wrote for one of my graduate classes.  It presents my thoughts on the invasion and why it failed.  Essentially it boils down to the invasion was 1-strategic overstretch and 2 poorly executed.  What do you think?The German invasion of European Russia was a huge mistake for several reasons, the biggest being that Germany had insufficient forces to win the first year.  Another reason is the force disparity between the German and Russian armies, and there is also the almost total lack of realistic logistics planning on the part of the German high command or OKH.  The German army did not have contingency plans for a winter campaign and were thus caught flat-footed when Russia failed to capitulate n 1941, this lack of planning was despite the recommendations of such officers as Guderian and Manstein.Several strategic principals were violated both in the conception and execution of the campaign.  These included concentration, mass, and unity of effort.  The Germans did not have the forces to both guard their flanks and concentrate at their chosen decisive points.  This lack of forces also caused them to sacrifice mass at critical sectors of the front and accept the tactical defense because they simply could not attack everywhere at once.  An example of this is the battle in the Elnya salient in August and September of 1941, while the Smolensk battle was raging.  The lacked unity of effort in that the different army groups competed for resources to accomplish too many objectives for the available forces.  This caused a disjointed advance as armored forces jumped from place to place along the front.The German plan envisaged the total defeat of the Russian army during the course of the initial battles, this calculation turned out to be optimistic.  As conceived the German army failed to accurately plan for the amount of resistance they received, instead believing that the Russian army would collapse.  They also failed to realistically appreciate the distances involved in a campaign in European Russia. And the wear this would place on vehicles.  It was unrealistic in the extreme to expect the German army to be able to advance over 1,500 kilometers in a few months while simultaneously defeating an army almost twice the size of the invading force.German intelligence was faulty; they underestimated almost everything about the size of the Russian army.  The Germans thought the Russians only had 5,000 tanks instead the true number was somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000.  they underestimated the size of the Russian field army by almost 100 divisions and did not take into account the combat experienced far eastern army, which they felt could not be deployed in time to affect the campaign.The most serious error committed by the German command was made by one man, Hitler, who lost his focus in the middle of the campaign and cost the advance on Moscow six weeks of good weather for a diversion to the south.  The strategic focus was not maintained because Hitler wanted economic gains which would fall to him anyway were the campaign successfully concluded.One of the least convincing arguments against Barbarossa is that it committed Germany to a two front war, because if Germany had won the first year as they planned or even the second year, there would have been no second front.  There is no reason to believe that the significant Japanese forces in the Far East would not have swept into the Russian Far East in the event of a German victory.Finally, while the German army perhaps brought the campaign to an initially successful conclusion, poor planning and bungled execution caused them to instead become engaged in a battle they could not win.  Though it took the Russians four years to defeat the Germans the seeds of their victory were sown in 1941 by their successful retention of Moscow.I believe the Kiev and Smolensk operations were a mistake because they diverted forces from the decisive point.  Moscow was then and is now the heart of Russia.  Something like 80% of the transport links between European and Asian Russia go through Moscow and almost all the north south links.  Once Moscow was taken, the rest of the country would have almost been fruit on the vine.  The southern armies would have lost their source of supply while the northern armies would have lost their sources of manpower.The only chance Germany had to win the war against Russia was by taking Moscow.  The armies around Kiev would have more than had their hands full dealing with Army Group South and any forces they could detach to attack Army group Center would have been at best small and ineffectual.  The Germans amply demonstrated their mastery of maneuver versus Russian capabilities. Erickson, John. The Road to Stalingrad. Reading, Berkshire, UK: Cox & Wyman Ltd., 2003Fugate, Bryan I.  Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941. Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1984Barnett, Corelli, ed. Hitler?s Generals. New York, NY: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989