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I recently finished a rather extensive study on Allied command failures in the Italian campaign 1943-45, and a couple of things jumped out at me. (Caveat: These are very broad generalizations for the sake of brevity, but I'll be happy to go into more detail if desired).1. Montgomery should have been relieved for his performance in Operation BAYTOWN and it's follow up.2. Mark Clark receives a lot of grief for his actions in Italy (and most of it is deserved), but he singularly stands out for having relieved two consecutive Corps commanders (Ernest "Mike" Dawley after Salerno and John Lucas in the midst of the Anzio beachhead battles). At the point he relieved Dawley, the U.S. had only six Corps commanders who had seen combat in the European Theater (North Africa, Sicily, and Italy) and Lucas was the third to be relieved -- a staggering 50%! attrition).3. Clark should probably have been relieved for countermanding Alexander's orders for the execution of Operation BUFFALO after the breakout from Anzio and the Gustav line, ordering Truscott to make for Rome rather than cutting off the major escape routes of the German Tenth Army -and if Truscott had run into trouble taking Rome, he probably would have been releived.4. The Allies were still novices at coalition warfare in the early stages of the Italian Campaign, but lessons learned there paid dividends in Northwest Europe.5. We tend to put histoircal figures such as Eisenhower, Alexander, Montgomery, and Clark on a bit of a pedistal when it comes to their thought processes and battle plans - giving them the benefit of the doubt when it comes ot developing and executing coherent plans, when upon further examination and scrutiny, they more often than not just kind of blundered through and got lucky.Interesting topic for me.
I am unclear why you think that way about Montgomery at Baytown. It seems to me that he knew he was going in at a disadvantage, but went anyway.
I am unclear why you think that way about Montgomery at Baytown. It seems to me that he knew he was going in at a disadvantage, but went anyway.
You answered your own question. He was reckless and arrogant.
Actually the attrition rate among the senior leadership was not as uncommon as you may think. Look at attrition due to relief in the French army of 1914 or the Union Army in the opening months of the Civil War. Combat has always separated the military managers from the warriors.
I am unclear why you think that way about Montgomery at Baytown. It seems to me that he knew he was going in at a disadvantage, but went anyway.
I'm not really sure about the disadvantage.Operations Baytown and Buttress were designed as a two corps level invasion, but the British X Corps was reassigned from Eighth Army to Clark's Fifth Army and designated for Operation Avalanche (the Salerno landings). Montgomery's landings went from two corps down to a brigade sized operation, and Montgomery felt slighted (and legitimately so).From Montgomery's point of view, the most experience commander of the most experienced army in the theater were being assigned what was, at best, a supporting role (and what was, at worst, a diversionary role). Operation Baytown was an opportunity that cried out to Monty's vanity and his sense of place in history - leading British troops onto the continent of Europe on the fourth anniversary of the start of the war, and instead of leading the main effort, the biggest part of the operation went to an inexperienced army commander (Clark) and utlized two Corps commanders who had no amphibious landing experience. So, while it is understandable that he was upset, his performance was, in my opinion, inexcusable.While his advance up from Reggio Calabria was overly cautious - which was in keeping with his previous campaigns - his delays appear to be more focused on punishing Alexander for giving the main mission to Clark and in response to not having already been selected for a major command in the scheduled cross-Channel invasion (he would leave Italy for a command position for Overlord in December - four months after Baytown). Montgomery's initial invasion faced no more than three German battalions - yet his pre-invasion bombardment utilized every artillery piece in Eighth Army (some 600 guns firing over 400 tons of ammunition), four battleships, and one monitor (no doubt he was making a statement) -- and after a week, when Clark was calling for Eighth Army's presence to threaten the German flank and rear at the Salerno beachhead, Montgomery ordered his lead division (British 5th Infantry) to halt for three days of rest, despite only having faced minimal resistance. While Montgomery claimed that his forces could not safely advance to Salerno, war correspondents with Eighth Army were able to drive up the main Italian roads to within a few miles of the Salerno beachhead unmolested by German troops. Scout mentions attrition of commanders in previous wars, and that's kind of my point. When I was putting this together Montgomery remineded me of what Lincoln said about McClelland - that he had a bad "case of the slows." Even Montgomery's biographer, Nigel Hamilton, describes Montgomery's actions as being vindictive and insubordinate, stating that he "“…now deliberately decided to make Alexander pay for his mistakes. He would not undertake any further operations for the moment, merely sit and watch." He acted, in my opinion, like a petulant child and should have been sacked or reprimanded - but as the hero of Alamein, he was safe from censure from Alexander, who he characterized as being "weak willed."
Monty was always petulant when he did not get his way. Look at how he acted after the Failure of Market Garden and the way he slow-stepped the Biritsh advance into Germany in the spring of '45. He is a perfect example of Prima-donna commander. Patton was too, but then Patton could subordinate his own pride to the mission as he showed when Bradley got 12th Army group and he had to keep 3rd Army.It is not as though Alamein were some brilliant operation either. It is the perfect example of a set-piece battle where one side holds all the cards. Even with all the material superiority he had Monty made plenty of mistakes in NA. His biggest in my opinion is his failure to fully interdict Rommels operational rear with the RAF. If he had done that, Operation Torch might not have been necessary.
If he had done that, Operation Torch might not have been necessary.
Huh... that sir, is the rub! (as they say). To Churchill, Torch was absolutely necessary - it was essential. If the Americans were not introduced to the Mediterranean, then the only other two options were: 1) they go straight to Great Britain and begin staging for the cross-Channel invasion, which would have been a disaster if executed in 1943 - especially without the benefit of Torch or Husky (or Avalanche), or 2) the Americans focus on the Pacific theater first - which could have almost been guaranteed if they didn't enter combat in the ETO in 1943.Not saying that failure to interdict Rommel's retreat with the RAF was directed or encouraged by Churchill - but an interesting thought exercise!
Absent the necessity for Torch and the subsequent invasion of Sicily it is entirely plausible that a Cross channel invasion in 1943 could have been successful. Don't forget that Chruchill always hate the idea of a cross-channel amphibious assault and did everything he could to divert resources to the Med and the “soft underbelly” of Europe. I have often wondered if historians need to dig deeper into communications between Churchill and his commanders to finds out how much stonewalling, if any, Churchill encouraged in his combatant commanders.
I agree that it would be a good area of research – there is little doubt in my mind that it occurred, but the question would be to what extent and to what consequences.Personally, I believe that if the American baptism of fire in Europe came in a cross-Channel invasion that it would have been a huge disaster. The lessons learned in logistics and combined-arms coordination in North Africa and Sicily (and Italy, for that matter) were invaluable. About the only aspect of American combat power that was up to snuff early in the war was artillery and naval gunfire. Tank-infantry coordination and close air support integration were honed in the Mediterranean against limited numbers of Germans who were worn by extended logistical issues - and there was still a very high price paid. Then there was the matter of command communications - not just higher to lower/lower to higher, but also amongst adjacent and supporting units. Just, for example, the uncoordinated near-disaster that was the airborne element of Husky... I think it would be fair to assume that the results would have been the same in a cross-Channel invasion, except on a larger scale. Likewise the logistical issues of ship-to-shore movement of combat-essential elements such as armor and anit-armor assets.My take is that if we had skipped the Mediterranean theater operations and pushed to stage in England for a cross-Channel invasion, Amdiral King would have ended up successfully shifting to a de facto - if not official - Pacific First strategy.
I am not so sure. Even in 1944 the allies combined arms coordination left something to be desired. The issue is not coordination in my opinion but timing. All the allies showed that they could learn on the fly. The fact reamains however that the channel coast defenses were much weaker in 1943 than in 1944 and the Germans were also concentrating much more on operations in Russia in 1943 because they still thought they could continue the strategic offensive there during that time.An extra year did make green US units much more proficient and lets face it, except for the assault divisions the vast majority of American units after D-day saw their first action in in France and not Italy. The argument that an extra blooded units is patently false. The US Army would have been sending guys straight from basic into combat in 43 just like the did in 44. I will admit though that an invasion in 43 would probably not have shortened the war. I am one of those that thinks the strategic bombing campaign did have some success and that did not really get stated until the summer and fall of 43. The extra year did let the Russians attrit the hell out of quality German forces as well as by 43 the Russians were starting to show some competencies in fighting the Germans forcing the Nazis to send first line forces to Russia instead of letting them wilt on occupation duty.In all it is probably a toss up. There were advantages and disadvantages to both courses of action. In the end, we did invade in 44 instead of 43. Id don't think the timing of the invasion actually changed the timing of the end of the war by more than a few weeks anyway.
Had Hitler not decided to fight the Battle of the Bulge, he could have extended the war a few months longer by slowly retreating and making a final stand on German soil. He had no fear of a nuclear bomb being used on the European mainland. But we were definitely not ready for a major invasion until 1944.
Why weren't we ready? The Allies certainly had enough resources available to mount major Amphibious operations in the Med. Using those resources it is certain that a lodgement could have been gained in Brittany and at least a minor port such as Cherbourg or Caen secured. The lack of resources argument is less than compelling. The Bulge was a desparate gamble for the Nazis, and a stupid one at that. Those units would have been better used in the East while what remained of East Prussia and the Sudetenland was evacuated. The real danger to Nazism was never the comparatively minor effort in the West, instead it was the massive Soviet army in the East that was perched on the German doorstep at the end of 1943. An allied invasion in 43 would have forced the Germans to divert forces to the west at a critical time. I would have done it in July after the Germans had just been owned around Kursk and they essentially had no Strategic reserves left.
Combat loading of ships for Torch was practically non-existent. Shore parties didn't know what were in ships' holds, and supplies were unloaded almost at random – typewriters were frequently landed and unloaded before ammunition or anti-armor assets. The Husky landings were only slightly better – and the airborne component of the invasion of Sicily was – by all honest assessments – a disaster, with the Allied fleet firing on, scattering aircraft formations, and shooting down many Allied transports. Those airborne troops (paratroopers and glider troops) that did land in Sicily were largely scattered and mostly ineffective. American tank and infantry coordination wasn't anywhere near ready to face the Wehrmacht in full force – with communications between ground troops and armor commanders not being improved until Sicily – and close air support coordination with troops engaged also went through a very steep learning curve in North Africa and Sicily. Allied anti-armor capabilities in the early stages of amphibious invasions (Gela and Salerno in particular) consisted almost solely of naval gunfire.Concerning the 7 combat experienced divisions sent from Sicily to England to form the core of the invasion force - yes, the British divisions would have been comprised of combat veterans, but the American forces would not. Not only were those division required to be the core of the invasion force, but the combat lessons of those veterans influenced the planning for the operation and the training of those units without combat experience.Overlord wasn't flawless - but problems would have increased geometrically if those lessons hadn't been learned in Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy.
I have to agree with Vulture on this. The resources were there, but the experience and logistical planning was not. The Allies just were not competent enough at major beach head invasions in 1943. Also, in 1943, the Allies still believed the best route to Germany was through the “soft underbelly.” Their logic was fairly sound, but it didn't pan out the way they had hoped. Meanwhile, Stalin begins to think his Allies are being deliberately incompetent so that Russia would bear the brunt of the war and exhaust Germany for them. If I were Stalin, I probably would have felt the same way.
