In fact, one could say Iraq is the opposite of Vietnam in mission and purpose: Vietnam was fought to contain communism, Iraq is being fought to roll back Islamists.

Speaking of Iraq/Vietnam comparisons, check out Cal Thomas’ article from today (November 22, 2005), Sounding the Trumpet of Retreat. Nemesis, you may enjoy this article.

“Vietnam” is just a catch-phrase spouted by the left to describe any war they don’t approve of. There is still a bit of a stigma attached to the Vietnam War and so they try to play on the public’s feelings by comparing whatever war/police action to Vietnam to try to rally support from the moonbats. Somehow a war that we are winning, with 2000 casualties, and have been involved in for only three years doesn’t seem to compare to a war we weren’t making progress on, had 52,000+ casualties, and had been involved in for over a decade. Then again, the leftists and the media aren’t concerned with truth or logic, they are only interested in hype and supporting their agenda

I agree with KJ that Vietnam is just a catchphrase used by the left. However, I would like to give everyone here some food for thought as far as military strategy and tactics are concerned. In this text, I think there are many comparisons that can be made between the two wars.

Gen. William Westmoreland attempted to fight the communist forces by search and destroy and conventional military tactics. Basically chasing enemy units around the countryside and turning the entire country into a war zone. Large infantry and armor units moved about the countryside in an effort to find, fix and destroy the enemy. U.S.A.F. close air support was used to destroy large pockets of resistance and bomb suspected marshalling areas. Artillery fire bases were placed on major hill masses and fired in support of maneuvering ground units. Often H&I, or harrassment and interdiction fires were lobbed into the countryside in an effort to disrupt nightime enemy movements.

Instead of sealing off the borders of South Vietnam and cutting the Ho Chi Mihn trail with the conventional forces and leaving the interior to the host nation and Special Forces, Westy had our troops on a constant wild goose chase. This left the borders open and alienated the entire population of South Vietnam because no village or farm was free from the destruction brought on by U.S. weapons. Add to this the fact that U.S. leaders discounted the effects of the civil affairs work done in the countryside to address the concerns of the locals. Our leadership also discounted human intel in the form of spy networks in favor of overhead photos by sat and U2 spyplane, signal intel and captured enemy personel.

Gen. Westmoreland tried to fight a geurilla war with conventional infantry, conventional weapons, conventional tactics and strategy and conventional military thinking.

Other than the initial invasion phase of the war in Iraq, we are fighting the war in nearly the same manner as we did in Vietnam. We have large infantry and armor units on constant patrol in both the major cities as well as the countryside. Whenever enemy fighters are detected larger units pile on and every component of our firepower is brought in. Meanwhile the border areas are not secure and foreign fighters can cross the frontiers at will. Many of Al Zirquawi's recruits infiltrate from western Syria and once in the country can move freely with the aid of the guerilla auxillary.

As far as tactics and overall strategy are concerned, we are in the process of making the same mistakes in Iraq as we did in Vietnam. If I were a General and I was the man in charge, this is what I would do:

1. Re-deploy all infantry, armor and artillery units to the border areas leaving behind small SF, Ranger, selected light infantry and MP units. Seal off the borders and use whatever firepower is needed in the hinterlands to stop fighters from infiltrating the country. The smaller more mobile units would be used to conduct raids, ambushes, and similar actions to fight any enemy forces that mass in the cities or the interior of the country.

2. Train as many U.S. pax as possible in the use of the local languages and infiltrate the mosques and religious organizations in Iraq as well as Syria and Iran if possible. U2 intel is never as good as a man on the ground.

3. Bug/wiretap or place under surveillance every Mosque suspected of subversive activity. When enough evidence of criminal or militant activity is gathered, conduct a raid and hold a VERY speedy trial of those arrested, including any religious leaders.

4. Use the Civil Affairs troops and PSYOPS to do the job of pacification like they should be. The reconstruction of Iraq has taken a back seat to building huge compounds for our troops and barriers/bunkers to protect them. Is it any wonder that some Iraqi's are suspicious of our long term intentions? We need to put the infrastructure of Iraq back together and build up the country, because when the locals see this happening, minds begin to change and the bad guys start to lose support.

The reason that I tend to think that Westmoreland was inept has to do with the career path that U.S. Army Officers go through in their development. They may choose (or are chosen for) broad career feilds;

Infantry
Artillery
Armor
Aviation
Quartermaster
etc.

The overwhelming majority of the top officers in the Pentagon come from the West Point/Infantry branch. The ringknockers have had things locked up in the General staff since before the Civil War.

Now when the majority of your training concerns straight Infantry/conventional combat, ie. WWII type Infantry/Armor/Artillery fighting, you tend to go with what you know. In other words, when all you have is a hammer, everything begins to look like a nail. Very few officers in the U.S. military recieve training in unconventional warfare. Fewer still really have an understanding of it and can properly apply U.S. forces to counter this type of threat.

This is not the first war that the U.S. has battled it out with enemy unconventional/guerilla forces. The Infantry officers in charge continue to use conventional tools in an unconventional role, and they cannot seem to figure out why things dont go their way.

These are just the larger wars we have had to fight against guerillas.
1. The Indian wars. Men like Geronimo tied up huge Cav units by using unconventional hit and run tactics.

2. The Philippine Insurection. Muslim jurimentado's terrorized U.S. forces for over 10 years before they were defeated.

3. WWII. Muslim guerillas formed by the Germans with the aid of the Gran Mufti of Jerusalem in 1943-44. These bands were formed late in the war across north Africa and even into the Baltics. German Werewolf units were also placed behind Allied lines in Europe and did huge damage to the Allied war effort. Otto Skorzeny and his units dressed as U.S. soldiers during the Battle of the Bulge comes to mind.

4. Korean conflict. Communist insurgents left behind the lines after the Inchon landings. When they realized that they were cut off, small bands of North Korean soldiers simply cast off their uniforms and blended in with the flow of refugees. These groups were especially active around Osan and Teagu during the war, disrupting supply lines and communications. Some of these cells are still believed to be active in South Korea today.

5. Vietnam and the Indochina war. The Vietcong were experts at hit and run tactics, never standing their ground against larger U.S. Infantry units. Instead, ambush, raids, sniping and bombings were their tools. The leadership in North Vietnam decided to sacrifice the Viet Cong during Tet in an effort to aid the North Vietnamese Army, but until that time, they outsmarted the best U.S officers. Conventional infantry tactics against guerilla's cost the U.S. dearly.

6. Iraq. Al-Quida learned the hard way in both Afghanistan and Iraq that they cannot win against us in an open fight. They resorted to the only effective method open to them, guerilla warfare. Fallujah was the last time they dared to stand and fight, and you can bet they wont make that mistake again. Ambushes, mines and bombs have become their tools and we have not properly adapted to this.

We seem hell bent on letting the conventional infantry officers do it all over again.

Westy had things well in hand against the NVA, but the Viet Cong had him in a bind. The best book out there that supports my theory is "A bright and shining lie, John Paul Van and America in Vietnam". If you can find a copy, Robin Moore's book "The Green Berets" is a masterpiece and will be one of the best books you will ever read. Of Course, old DWS though different, but I'm convinced I'm right.

For those of you who will argue that we freed the Iraqi people from Sadam's tyranny and mass murder, I would ask how many Iraqis are dying today at Iraqi hands and are they safer than they were before the invasion?

Good point.? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

The one thing that is common is that we are not regarded as saviors but rather as unpopular foreign invaders in both situations.

I think this is the case? no matter who is occupying who. Wouldnt we be resnetful if we were occupied by a foriegn nation?