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I read something recently that I found rather shocking – by the winter of 1862-63, up to 75% of the horses and mules lost by the Army of Northern Virginia, were lost due to starvation, disease, and being abandoned due to them being too weak and malnourished to be of use. I had previously read about the issues of the Confederacy trying to find room or supply trains from North Carolina into Virginia for fodder for the animals - more than just cavalry, but those animals necessary for hauling the wagon trains necessary to support and supply the army.I had no idea that animal losses to lack of fodder had been quite that high.Hmmm...
The Confederacy had a hard enough time feeding its soldiers much less its horses and mules. Once the Western part of the Confederacy was cut off and isolated, the ability to maintain supplies became a logistical nightmare.
There was a lack of fodder in Virginia for the number of horses and mules in use – and the railroad refused to carry the amount of fodder needed by the Army of Northern Virginia because it took up too much space – wasn't profitable. Remember that the Confederacy never “nationalized” their railroads like the Union did.
You just got the latest edition of the Journal of Military history didn't you? I recently read an article in there that discussed this very topic.
You just got the latest edition of the Journal of Military history didn't you? I recently read an article in there that discussed this very topic.
No, I just finished reading Edward Hagerman's The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command and that is one point that really stood out to me - especially where he started describing the number of box car loads of fodder that were necessary to keep the animals in fighting shape.
There is a very good article in the July issue of the Journal of Military History that discusses the problems both the Union and Confederacy had with trying to maintain adequate remounts during the war. It deals specifically with horses for the artillery and the tactical and organizational changes cased by the lack of good horses as the war went on. It is a good argument about a topic that is often ignored or dismissed as irrelevant.
There are a lot of dabblers in military history who are quick to dismiss the importance of logistics, combat support, and combat service support because it isn't as “sexy” or glorious — but they miss the point that it is often the decisive factor.
There are a lot of dabblers in military history who are quick to dismiss the importance of logistics, combat support, and combat service support because it isn't as "sexy" or glorious -- but they miss the point that it is often the decisive factor.
Exactly! The Union constructed a very robust supply network utilizing captured waterways, rail depots, and crossroads. Louisville, Ky. was the central hub for the entire Western Theater. From Louisville to Nashville to Vicksburg, the Union built a very hefty supply network while destroying anything the Confederates could use (and often the Confederates destroyed assets themselves as they retreated). Look at all the pictures of railroad rails wrapped around polls. Of course the Union became quite proficient at restoring anything the Confederates destroyed.
There are a lot of dabblers in military history who are quick to dismiss the importance of logistics, combat support, and combat service support because it isn't as "sexy" or glorious -- but they miss the point that it is often the decisive factor.
Those are the ones that have never even served in the military, much less been in combat. Anyone that has ever missed a LOGPAC because S-4 messed something up perfectly understand the importance of supply. Logistics may not be as glamorous as Combat Arms but is JUST as vital to success in war. Beans and bullets are one of the main things that allow armies to be victorious, without them defeat is guaranteed.
