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The War Guilt clause is a controversial bit of WWI historiography and has been blamed for WWII.Clarification: The War Guilt cause fed directly into the German interwar Far-rights stab in the back theory. They used it to claim the allies knew they had not defeated the Germans on the field of battle and forced the Wiemar regime to accede to war guilt to get a treaty at all. It was more a weapon to use against the German moderates for the Nazis than anything else. I am not implying that it caused WWII, more that it fed into Nazi and wider German resentment against the peace. There were many things wrong about Versailles, this is just one of them.
I don't know about blaimng it alone for WWII, but it was an unreasinable judgement on Germany. Who was the Black Hand working for? Didn't Russia put troops along Germany's border first? Is it correct to put blame on another country if an ally is an aggressor?
Here is the clause:"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."Can such a clause be blamed for WWII? Perhaps yes and no; yes in the sense that it was probably used by Hitler to stir up nationalism and help him in his rise to power. No in the sense that Germany was indeed to blame and that Hitler was an intervening cause that helped usher in Germany's rise to power; in other words, we can't blame a bit of the truth for another man's actions.In the end I think such clauses are probably a bad idea and shouldn't be included in modern treaties.
Instead of accepting the true causes of WWI (to which all the European powers were a party); nationalism, militarism, imperialism, and the alliance system and working to solve the problems and bring Germany back into the family, so-to-speak, they sought to punish Germany. Each country had their own reasons and all were self-serving; we (the US) had a messianic president that was cutting his place in world history and by trying to make us (the US) the worlds savior.It's like with your kids... if you let them feel like you've heard their case and let them speak their piece they are more likely to accept their punishment (if it is reasonable). Germany was ignored, gagged, and had their nose rubbed in it by the T of V; this gave Hitler (or anyone else that would come later) all the ammo he (they) needed to get things stirred up. The Big Four booted it big-time.Just my $0.02....Wally
I am trying to spark a debate here about the wars origination. I think the wars causes are many and varied but German culpability is not part of it. I would argue that the main cause of thew war was the inability or disinclination of any of the belligerents to back down once tensions began to escalate. I particularly blame the Tsar for choosing to back Serbia to the hilt. Serbia was clearly implicated in the plot to assassinate the archduke and subsequent history has shown that the Austrian's were correct in the results of their investigation. They were right in insisting on justice from Serbia. Russia chose to mobilize and throw its weight around. Germany was both treaty and honor bound to back Austria in their demands for redress from Serbia. I don't think the German “Blank Check” to Austria theory holds water. Russia could have stopped the crisis at any time by staying out of it, they did not. Russian mobilization triggered German mobilization which triggered the activation of defense treaties across the continent which led to war.I contend with many other historians that Versailles was a flawed and essentially unenforceable treaty from the outset. The War Guilt Clause is simply the most egregious part of the treaty. I can understand why the Allies wanted it but that does not mean they were justified in insisting on it.
I don't think the German "Blank Check" to Austria theory holds water.
If that theory implicated Germany, then I don't either. It just gave Austria-Hungary the "liberty" to do what they wanted.
.... I particularly blame the Tsar for choosing to back Serbia to the hilt. ... Russian mobilization triggered German mobilization which triggered the activation of defense treaties across the continent which led to war.....
Panslavism explains the first part... interesting though that Germany would threaten Russia (that threatened Austria and attack then France when they stood up for Russia. By way of Belgium.
Panslavism seems kind of a simplistic explanation for the adventurism that led to a general European war. This is especially so given that the Russian army was in the midst of modernizing it's weapons mix and force structure and was several years from completing that task. The Russian army was in no shape to go to war in 1914. Additionally, the monarchy itself was on shaky ground and the full effects of the 1905 revolution had not been dealt with by 1914. Add to this the content of the Willy-Nicky telegrams and it paints a picture of a general staff with a warped picture of their readiness who bullied and lied to a weak Tsar. I for one, except the sentiments expressed in the Willy-Nicky telegrams as genuine, I dont believe either the Tsar or the Kaiser wanted war, they were unwilling participants at best.I would not say pan-slavism, I would rather say that it was a Russian desire to avoid intereference in what they considered their sphere of influence coupled with a false appreciation for their own readiness. Russian decision-making appears to me to be Realpolitik gone awry rather then rational calculations of strength and influence.
I can agree with this assessment for the most part; the immediate run up plays like a school yard fight though. Austria threatens Serbia, Russia backs the Serbs, Germany steps ups for Austria... France speaks up (against Germany) for Russia, which then begins to move. So Germany attacks France, which involves England since the attack comes through Belgium. Too bad the teacher didn't blow the whistle on all this while it was still in the bullying (diplomatic message)stage... sadly it came to blows.
I can actually understand the strange strategic logic that led Germany to attack France instead of Russia. Looked at on the basis of Moltke the Younger's and Schleiffen's assumptions it was even the right thing to do. Unfortunately troops dont and didnt March or fight as fast as the staff tables said they would. This left the Germans in the unenviable position of fighting the two-front war they wanted to avoid in the first place.
The way I understand it, the Germans felt getting France out of the way* was the priority as the French were the greater challenge and Russia was still in the process of getting their act together… still behind the curve… technologically. Does this jive with what you know (or even make sense)?*Thus avoiding the two front war....
I don't think the Germans thought the French were the greater “challenge”, they calculated that they could defeat France and still have time to switch forces to the east in time to stop the Russians. They estimated that Russia would take 6-8 weeks to fully mobilize and wanted to win in the West before then. The way things worked out the Germans did not defeat France but still managed to hold on in the east by a combination of brilliant German maneuvers and capitalizing on Russian idiocy in the Masurian lakes campaign that ended with the Battle of Tannenberg. Russia was still modernizing but what they had going for them was size. The Russian army was huge at full mobilization strength. That is mostly what kept them from collapsing earlier than they did. The Russians absorbed losses that would have made other armies admit defeat. Both Keegan and Ferguson explain the nature of Russian losses in details in their works on the history of WWI.A two-front war between Russia and France had been the German/Prussian nightmare since the eighteenth century and the Seven-Years War. If you recall avoiding the possibility of a two-front war was the point of much of Bismarckian diplomacy in the late 19th century. What stopped the German Plan from working were march speeds and logistics. The German armies marched some prodigious distances in August 1914 and then fought some pretty big battles straight from the march. I am fairly certain modern armies could not do that.
I cannot fault your post… I stand corrected (sort of, since I think we are saying, in essence, the same thing… in degrees).
I agree, we are sort of saying the same thing.The big difference is that I get the impression from reading some of the pre-war German military journals that the Germans expected the French to be led poorly, as poorly as they were in 1870. They also expected them to fight hard, which they did but fighting hard and fighting stupid racks up huge casualty lists. This is exactly what happened. The French lost something like 500,000 casualties n the first two months of the war. They did fight stupid, there is only partial truth to the saying that "the best defense is a good offense", the French proved this mostly false with expensive but failed counterattacks. The British saved the French in 1914. Joffre would not have had the time to shift forces for the first Battle of the Marne if not for the BEF's stands at Le Cateau, Mons, and Ligny.In all, the German plan was good if technology had been ten or even five more years advanced than it was. Motor transport would have ensured the fall of France in 1914 just as surely as it did in 1940.
