- This topic has 7 voices and 7 replies.
-
Posts
-
A handwritten note from Lincoln to General Meade, urging him to stop General Lee's army after the battle at Gettysburg, was recently found in the National Archives.See the story here recently published: Original Lincoln document found From the article:
The text of Lincoln's note has been publicly known because the general to whom Lincoln addressed it telegraphed the contents verbatim to the front lines at Gettysburg. There, the Union army's leaders failed for more than a week to aggressively pursue Lee following his defeat
But the article goes on to say that the discovery of the note substantiates what has been said because it's a primary source for the information. This may lead to general question - do you think we would have seen an early end to the war had Lee been stopped after Gettysburg? Also, what do you think of the discovery of the message?
I think Meade was right not to pursue Lee. His army was beat up and he didnt know the real condition of Lee's or how much of his artillery was still intact. I understand Lincolns zeal to end the war but after a battle like gettysburg Meade had to stop and regroup.
I think Meade was right not to pursue Lee. His army was beat up and he didnt know the real condition of Lee's or how much of his artillery was still intact. I understand Lincolns zeal to end the war but after a battle like gettysburg Meade had to stop and regroup.
This is exactly correct. Meade understood his men were fatigued, disorganized, and had won a battle from a primarily defensive posture. He was in no position to follow up the victory because he had taken horrible casualties on the first two days of the battle and a considerable amount of damage on the final day as well. Daniel Sickles's men were bludgeoned in the apple orchard on the second day, and Chamberlain's men were utterly spent from their tireless defense of Little Round Top. Lee's retreat occurred in the middle of the night and by the time Meade realized Lee was in full retreat, Lee was safely across the Rappahannock River and able to takeup defensive positions. Quite simply, what Lincoln hoped for was impossible, and he eventually realized it...but not without regret. Meade thankfully turned the Army of the Potomac over to Grant after Gettysburg because he had had enough of being in the hot seat. Meade was a good defensive general, but he was not as gifted in offensive tactics, and a venture back into the Shenadoah Valley was something he knew was not up his alley.
Meade made the correct decision to avoid pursuit after Gettysburg. Lee and the Reb army was more than capable of defeating the Union if they had pursued with the exhausted forces available at the end of the battle. Lee would have been on the defensive and union numbers would not have told as heavily.
I think what Lincoln wanted was very doable, but not with Meade as the commanding general. Grant, Sherman, or Sheridan, for example, were capable of doing what Lincoln wanted. The South was in worse shape than the North. They too had suffered great causality; they were out of ammunition for their cannons so assuming a defensive position might not have worked. The South also had to evacuate their wounded, so the North had the opportunity--and numbers--to get ahead of Lee, cut him off from supplies and force the South to attack to get home. Or, alternatively, to surround Lee.
For Meade though, it wasn't so much the right decision not to pursue (and he did pursue, as best he could), but the only decision he could make. The I Corps was exhausted, the XI Corps was broken and demoralized, and the III Corps had been absolutely shattered. Both the I and the III Corps would be merged into other corps, and the XI Corps would be transferred west, never to fight with the AoP again.In terms of commanders, Reynolds was dead and John Newton, unproven in corps command, was running what was left of the I Corps. Sickles had lost a leg. The V Corps had been committed piecemeal, and had lost more than a few of its brigade commanders.Meade had three intact corps: the II, the VI, and the XII. The XII Corps was under the command of Slocum, who Meade had no confidence in at all, and was notorious for slowness. The II had fought hard and was pretty tired, but more than that, they'd lost Hancock on the third day of the fighting. All that was really left was the VI Corps under Sedgwick.In order to even think about mounting a major attack on Lee, Meade would have needed to rearrange his army's structure on the fly. He really did all that he could.
For Meade though, it wasn't so much the right decision not to pursue (and he did pursue, as best he could), but the only decision he could make. The I Corps was exhausted, the XI Corps was broken and demoralized, and the III Corps had been absolutely shattered. Both the I and the III Corps would be merged into other corps, and the XI Corps would be transferred west, never to fight with the AoP again.In terms of commanders, Reynolds was dead and John Newton, unproven in corps command, was running what was left of the I Corps. Sickles had lost a leg. The V Corps had been committed piecemeal, and had lost more than a few of its brigade commanders.Meade had three intact corps: the II, the VI, and the XII. The XII Corps was under the command of Slocum, who Meade had no confidence in at all, and was notorious for slowness. The II had fought hard and was pretty tired, but more than that, they'd lost Hancock on the third day of the fighting. All that was really left was the VI Corps under Sedgwick.In order to even think about mounting a major attack on Lee, Meade would have needed to rearrange his army's structure on the fly. He really did all that he could.
Excellent points all. Gettysburg was the beginning of the end, but Vicksburg arguably was the more valuable victory.
I think what Lincoln wanted was very doable, but not with Meade as the commanding general. Grant, Sherman, or Sheridan, for example, were capable of doing what Lincoln wanted.
Too bad all three of them were in the west and if any of them had been at Gettysburg it is doubtful that the victories in the west would have happened. One thing it is necessary to do when studying any war is to take a holistic approach. It is very rare in history that one battle has decided a war. It is more common for the sum of many campaigns/battles to decide a war. The main exception is when a head of state is captured or killed and even that is not always a war ender. Witness Sedan in 1870 or Poitiers in 1356 in both cases a sitting French Monarch was captured but the war itself continued.
