Had Hitler finished off England first, then invaded Russia with his full might, he “might” have had more success.  The Russians were just so willing to absorb insane amounts of casualties, the Germans would have over extended themselves regardless.  Once the Russians fell behind the Ural Mountains, the Germans really had no chance of pushing past that barrier (not that they really ever wanted to go that far either).

Scout 1067 — you'll enjoy that class, I took it last year.You mention the Russo-Finnish Winter War 1939-1940.  While December 1939 showed Soviet incompetence, don't ignore February-March 1940 when Chief of Staff Shaposhnikov reorganized the Leningrad Military District into the Northwestern Front and put the Soviet operations in Finland under Timoshenko's leadership.  Timoshenko brought in Georgi Zhukov as his chief of staff and halted all operations in Finland in order to reorganize, re-train, and rehearse.  They focused the entire operation on the Karelian Isthmus and attacked with overwhelming force - up to 80 artillery pieces per mile of frontage - and wore the Finns down with an unyielding tempo of operations.Timoshenko's Karelian campaign of February-March 1940 is often ignored in the larger picture of WWII, but the reforms implemented there carried over to the winter campaign of 1941-42.  The Soviets learned many lessons related to fighting a brutal winter war and also shaped their overall offensive doctrine that would become apparent two and a half years later.Yes, the Finns taught the Russians a hard, hard lesson in the early phase of the Winter War, not just at Suomussalmi but across the entire Finnish frontier.  The Western World snickered under their breath at the demonstrated Soviet incompetence, and it may have contributed to Hitler's decision to launch Barbarossa -- but he was already planning the operation and may well have attacked when he did because he knew (or believed) that if he didn't, then Stalin would attack him in the coming year or two once his military reforms were complete.  If you examine the record, you will find that the Soviets studied these lessons in April 1940 and initiated broad reforms.  The bureaucracy and inefficiency of the Soviet system prevented wide spread progress, but you can see those same lessons and reforms applied to the Soviet counter-offensive starting in early December 1941 outside of Moscow.Soviet recovery from their demonstrated incompetence began in January 1940, was demonstrated in February in Finland, and was formalized in April 1940.  If it hadn't begun until after Barbarossa had begun, I believe that the counter-offensive outside Moscow would have been unlikely.

Scout ? we may just have to agree to disagree on this one.I?m not saying that the Soviet performance in the December 41 counter-offensive was anywhere near masterful.  My point was that, while the first two months of the Russo-Finnish ?Winter War? was an embarrassing disaster for the Soviets, the last two months were a foreshadowing of the Red Army that would destroy the bulk of the Wehrmacht in the war of movement that came in 1944 and 45.With the change of command of the Soviet Forces in Finland in January 1940, Timoshenko and Zhukov went into the defensive only long enough to reorganize, concentrate forces, and train.  They improved command and control and trained troops in the coordination of supporting arms, coordination of tank-infantry teams, use of aerial observers to control massed artillery fires (airborne in tethered balloons), and proper coordination of logistics.  They also trained in the basics of winter warfare.  (The December attacks had utilized Ukrainians ? many of whom had never even seen more than a dusting of snow before.)When the offensive was resumed in February 1940, it bore virtually no resemblance to the previous offensive.  The offensive started on 1 February with an average of 80 artillery pieces per mile of front firing the largest barrage since Verdun ? some 300,000 shells in the first 24 hours.  The barrage increased in intensity for eleven days until the main assault was launched. Timoshenko concentrated 35 divisions on the Karelian Isthmus and employed them in succession so that as one was approaching being spent, another took its place.  At the key Viipuri Gateway near the village of Summa the Soviet 7th Army massed nine infantry divisions, five tank brigades, one rifle-machinegun brigade and ten artillery regiments.  The result was an unyielding operational tempo that the Finns could not deal with.  Within about 3 weeks the Finns sought terms.  Estimated (and I stress ?estimated?) Soviet losses for the Winter War are believed to be somewhere between 230,000 to 270,000 killed (to all causes) and probably an additional 200,000 wounded? but the majority of those losses came in the December phase of the campaign.  The official Soviet history of the Winter War describes the Red Army?s losses only as ?excessive and avoidable.?Now, to my point originally ? from 14-17 April 1940 the Supreme Military Soviet met at the Kremlin to review the lessons learned from the Winter War and instituted reforms.  These included restoring enlisted ranks within infantry units (NCOs) to improve command and control among those units doing the fighting; reducing the role of the frontline political commissar from co-commander in order to ensure unity of command; formalized winter tactics, clothing, equipment, and shelter; focus on brigade level over the snow mobility; and procurement of winter lubricants for weapons and vehicles.  The lessons of tank-infantry team coordination instituted by Timoshenko and Zhukov in January 1940 were to be standardized and reinforced across the Red Army.  The doctrine of massing forces at key locations on the battlefield in order to create an escalating operational tempo that their opponents could not match was also to be instituted across the Red Army.  The Soviets also brought back the submachine gun that had fallen into disfavor in the late 1930s (due primarily to the Soviet logistical system?s inability to keep the units supplied with ammunition), based largely on the recognized effectiveness of the Finnish 9mm ?Soumi? submachine gun. Also, it was decided that the ?sport? of cross-country skiing was to be an approved and encouraged activity for the civilian populace.  And this one seems like a ?no-brainer?, but it was recognized that units formed from populations from arctic regions should be the primary force used in winter warfare.Now, obviously these reforms were implemented with standard Soviet bureaucracy and inefficiency.  Stalin, at this point, was still viewing the Red Army with a paranoid eye.  So reform moved at a glacial pace.Now, when the counter-offensive was launched outside of Moscow in December 1940 only a few of these reforms were in effect.  Far from throwing their last trained reserves into the fight, the Soviet Army mustered 56 divisions in reserve.  They were, however, largely thrown piecemeal into the battle, due mainly to the desperate situation.  Nonetheless, the Soviets did employ up to brigade sized ski units (some effectively, some ineffectively).  Unlike those divisions that stormed across the Finnish frontier two years earlier, these units wore winter uniforms, including felt foot wraps, and had lubricants on their weapons that functioned much better than the German weapons in the severe cold.  The counter-offensive pushed the Germans back between 50 and 150 miles before they were spent.  The Soviet logistical and command and control system had not matured that much, and when the first signs of success started to show, Stalin intervened and diluted the effort.Another interesting note to some of the reforms that had taken place in the intervening years between 1939 and 1941 is to look at the non-combat casualty lists.  Outside of Moscow, the Germans suffered some 100,000 frostbite casualties by the end of December ? some 14% of which required amputation.  (Guderian reported losing twice as many men to frost as to enemy action.) By the end of the winter, that number had climbed to over 250,000.  In the Red Army at the same time, frostbite was a punishable offense ? so the number of reported cases were insignificant in comparison.  (Notice, I say ?reported? cases, no doubt many went unreported).What I?m suggesting here is that the Red Army that launched Operation Mars and Uranus in the winter of 1942 and later pushed the Wehrmacht out of Russia and back into Germany had it?s operational roots in the Red Army that stormed the Karelian Isthmus in late February and March 1940. If Timoshenko and Zhukov had not had the opportunity to start to "fix what was broken" in the Winter War and start to get those reforms recognized in the Kremlin, then who knows when these reforms would have started and when they would have an effect against the Wehrmacht.

Yet Russian incompetence was still very much present even at the Battle of Berlin when 700,000 Russian casualties were incurred (many by friendly fire of artillery barrages fired from accross the city at each other).  Zhukov was the Ulysses S. Grant of Soviet military history.  He knew he had the men and guns to wear down the Germans, and so he had no problems in using them to that end.