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On second thought, the Russians did have a de-mobilization plan. It was called the Bolshevik Revolution. ;D
After a bit of research I'm convinced that the only reason the war wasn't over (and a victory for the Central Powers) was the valor and savvy of the Canadian contingent. Thank God and General Sir Arthur Currie!
The things listed in this thread are very interesting. BTW, many times the "details" are left out of the textbooks! One example is the details surrounding the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and how really it was a series of circumstances (right place right time for the assassin) that made it happen. One has to wonder if there would have been war without the assassination, from what I'm reading I think there still would have been war.
One has to wonder if there would have been war without the assassination, from what I'm reading I think there still would have been war.
I don't think there's any doubt that there would've been a War nonetheless. It wasn't like there was some kind of a tranquility period before the war, the Crimean War was only a few decades before. There was unrest in the Balkans, the Alsace-Lorraine, the colonies in Africa, the middle east. You name it there was a conflict brewing. The Empires were dissolving into nation states and that's almost never without any bloodshed.
The assassination of Franz Ferdinand was merely the spark that set a continent full of kindling alight. The Moroccan crisis of 1912 or any of the previous Balkan wars could have done the same. There is some truth to the view that Europe was an armed camp waiting for a fight. We should not forget that at that time the balance of power theory of foreign relations held sway throughout Europe. Diplomats and statesman were conditioned to think in terms of power blocs and what would maintain the balance. This thought process goes far to explain the tangled web of alliances and mutual defense treaties that existed at the time.
Okay – forgive me for bringing up an old thread, but I wanted to drop a couple of cents in the discussion.I think that what really drove Europe into a World War in 1914 rather than just another localized Balkan war, was the coflict between the old and the new in Europe. Primarily, military growth and modernization greatly outpaced the growth and modernization of European diplomacy. Since the unification of Germany in the Franco-Prussian war, the European powers all sought to modernize their militaries in the model of the Prussians. Advanced staff colleges were created and professional general staffs were formed (or re-formed) in the model of the Prussian Great General Staff. Senior staff officers were trained and promoted largely on merit (no so much with field commanders, but that is a different discussion). Staff college classes worked classroom problems with real world scenarios - developing war plans, mobilization tables, and logistical support frameworks. On the diplomatic side, there was no corresponding professionalization of the diplomatic corps. Appointments were done largely on family connections or political favors. Diplomacy was learned through mentoring, and diplomatic dealings were generally a slow paced, social affair. When the crisis of July 1914 erupted, diplomatic communications were still delivered by courrier or in person by the diplomat - not by telegraph or cable.From 1870 to 1914, military staffs were focused on winning the next war when, not if, conflict came. All military maneuvering within the governments was to assure military advantage in a crisis. Tempo of operations and mobilization were key elements of military strategy. Diplomatic strategy in the same time period was little changed from the period 50 years before - the goal was to avoid war at almost all costs. The result was that the diplomats were largely steamrollered by the events of July and August 1914.I believe that many in that time believed that a large scale war in Europe was inevitable (especially after Bismarck was dismissed), but I don't think any envisioned the scale and destruction that inevitably came with it. Huge amounts of national capital was being spent on weapons, arms, and armaments. Conflict was inevitable but not necessarily as an outgrowth of what was called "The Third Balkan War" in 1914.
I don't necessarily agree with you about the pace of Diplomacy although I largely share your assessment of the state of military affairs in Europe prior to the war. On diplomacy, the telegraph was vital although personal contact was and remains important to this day. Most of the diplomatic communications went by telegraph, even the Ultimatum to Serbia at the end of July. The Willy-Nicky telegrams between Kaiser and Tzar show that the telegraph was utilized if nothing else. The telegraph also figured into calculations, the Austrians did not deliver their ultimatum to Serbia until the French premier and foreign minister had left St Petersburg and were presumably out of contact on the state yacht. Diplomacy moved fast when needed. The failure in 1914 was one of vision, the various heads of state and decision makers failed to envision a scenario out of the crisis short of war, they wanted a war (particularly Russia and Austria) and so they got one.
