- This topic has 6 voices and 29 replies.
-
Posts
-
The End of Military HistoryI am sure most of us are at least familiar with Francis Fukuyama?s famous piece from 1989 where he predicted that the West had been triumphant over the forces of oppression and dictatorship in the world. If not, it is here:The End of History?Professor Andrew Bacevich has produced a new one in the same vein entitled The End of Military History. It is an attempt to claim that traditional military force is no longer effective in our post modern world. If nothing else this piece is worth some serious thought.I don?t know that I completely agree with his premise. In fact, I think he is just as wrong as Fukuyama has proven to have been in the 20+ years since he wrote his famous essay. It is certain that conventional military forces have difficulty in pacifying, or winning if you will, an insurgency. That is not to say that they are totally ineffective as Prof. Bacevich apparently claims. I think a very good case can be made that the application of military force, in concert with local and national diplomacy, is well on the way to being victorious in Iraq. It was certainly victorious in the opening weeks of the Iraq War. The big difference between contemporary wars and the Great power wars of the 20th century is that in the current environment we do not destroy the enemy country in victory as the Allies did to Germany or Japan. There was no sense or feeling of defeat in the Clausewitzean meaning of the term among the people of Iraq or Afghanistan following the western invasions of their countries. I might even go so far as to say that classical war principals were not applied in either contemporary case. We sought victory but not decisive military victory. You could even go so far as to claim that Coalition forces were not sufficiently ruthless in achieving their victory. We did not get in the losers face and emphasize that they were beaten the way the Allies did to the losers after the two World Wars.I certainly don?t think we have seen the end of conventional conflict. If anything, we are currently in an interregnum between Great Power wars much like what happened in Europe between 1815 and 1866. The current wars are the equivalent of the French invasion of Algeria or the Crimean War. Conventional war will return to the world stage, the question is not if, but when?
.... Conventional war will return to the world stage, the question is not if, but when?
All too true; witness Korea... the leadership thought the A-Bomb was the end all to conventional war. So much so that the troops that were first in were only in Japan for a "combat olympics" since there would never be need of boots on the ground any more.
One has to wonder if there will EVER be a war were the victor completely decimates their opponent. Carthage destroyed, covered in salt and was wiped off the face of the earth by the Romans. Is that “true” victory? Is there something to be said for that type of victory over what we perceive as victory today? Just playing dvils advocate, but have we REALLY achieved "victory" in Iraq? Was victory even the goal? Wouldn't REAL victory have been similar to victories of old where the victor ensured that the vanquished were not allowed the opportunity to come back and haunt them? I don't know... I'm not so sure victory is what I would call it in Iraq... I think probably there was success in the initial goal, but not really victory.I'm not sure my thoughts here have come across as I wanted. I guess for my thinking there is a difference between victory and success. I am not saying that I think we should go to Iraq and kill all the men and sons and enslave the women, but in ancient times that would have been the case to ensure victory.
I don't get these “end of whatever” things sometimes. Often, the authors treat them as if all warfare was conventional when it wasn't. Yes, using WWI and WWII as examples is fine, but those weren't the only wars. The Persian, Peloponnesian, and wars of Alexander were all combinations of conventional and unconventional as well as hot and cold wars.
Isaac Asimov once wrote an article on the possibility of finding intelligent life on other planets. He went through a lot of the standard factors that make it seem unlikely that this is the only place it ever happened and also threw in another factor – time. His theory was that in order for intelligent life forms to find each other, they needed to progress to the point of communicating and/or traveling across great expanses of space. What he theorized drives life forms to do this is competition and battles for resources. As the civilization improves technology, it applies the new technology to weapons whenever possible to gain a competitive advantage. At some point, a weapon is developed that outstrips the reproductive capacity of the species and the civilization automatically comes to an end. Factoring that in, his theory was that it is unlikely we will encounter another civilization before ours comes to an end.Of course, it is just a theory...
I won't get into the argument of what constitutes victory. I do however; think that the article is completely wrong in asserting that the era of conventional warfare is over. In the unipolar military world in which we live now there is no other conventional power that can reasonably hope to take on the US and win. That is not just hyperbole, it is my subjective assessment. There is no other power in the world that has the force projection capabilities of the US. There are a few powers on the horizon and they are India and China. Europe is out because of their anemic level of defense spending and general societal pacifism. Another area where conventional conflict is possible but perhaps not as likely is between Israel and the Arab nation of your choice, I prefer Syria or maybe Hezbollah.The next question is how long can this state of affairs last? I would guess that within twenty years the US will have faded away to a backwater power such as Britain is today. China and India are the next two Great Powers. They are also located such that they are bound to come into conflict with each other over regional issues. Don?t forget Pakistan as well. There are plenty of areas where china and India can come into conflict, most notably in the Himalayas and trade or trade opportunities. China is also likely to start a conflict over the Spratleys dispute especially if the rumors are true that there is oil near those islands.
I guess what I am getting at is maybe it would be better to take the attitude of history and just conquer and let the game run it's course as long as it can, with the thought that regardless, SOMEONE is going to come along eventually and knock us down a notch or two and be the new big kid on the block. Not a matter of if but when. Run the game of conquering instead of being victorious and extend the reign a bit…Again, playing devils advocate... is that answer? Don't know and believe we won't know because I don't think the US will ever take that strategy.
The next question is how long can this state of affairs last? I would guess that within twenty years the US will have faded away to a backwater power such as Britain is today. China and India are the next two Great Powers. They are also located such that they are bound to come into conflict with each other over regional issues. Don?t forget Pakistan as well. There are plenty of areas where china and India can come into conflict, most notably in the Himalayas and trade or trade opportunities. China is also likely to start a conflict over the Spratleys dispute especially if the rumors are true that there is oil near those islands.
I think it'll take much more than 20 years for China and India to rise to true "world power" status. I think that they can bluster and pose (much as the U.S. did at the end of the 19th and start of the 20th Centuries - but not necessarily have the power to back it up... and I think it'll take more than 20 years for the U.S. to fade.I think the crux of the argument is the definition of "conventional" warfare. Warfare evolves constantly and what is accepted as "conventional" changes as well. It hasn't been that long since bombing civilian population centers into rubble was a key component of "conventional" warfare, and now fire bombing a modern city is anathema to what we would consider modern conventional warfare. Two hundred years ago, "conventional" warfare allowed a commander to surrender his unit under the courtesy the honors of war after he had made enough of a show of resistance in the face of the enemy - he could march his force off with their arms, flags, honor, and one cannon with a promise not to fight again.I think that one key issue is that the author, Bacevich, equates "victory" with "conquering". In the modern wars that he has mentioned, I don't believe that the political or diplomatic goals were to conquer the enemy nation - but instead to restore a status quo or attain some other limited objective. The goal of "Gulf War One" wasn't to defeat Saddam Hussein or conquer Iraq - the goal was to liberate Kuwait. Now, whether that was the right goal or not is open to debate - but that would more appropriately fall under an essay of "The End of Diplomatic History" or perhaps "The End of Effective Political Foreign Policy" or perhaps most accurately "The End of Political Resolve in Foreign Policy".War is, as Clauswitz said, is a political instrument. It is the extension of policy by other means (other than diplomatic or economic). The combined horrors of the two world wars of the first half of the 20th Century - as well as the dawning of the nuclear age - have tempered the leaders of the industrialized nations to avoid decisive conflict. Yet this avoidance of decisive conflict hasn't negated the role of "conventional" war. There have been plenty of "small wars" where infantry, artillery, armor, naval, and air assets have been employed (and employed effectively, given the limited objectives of the conflicts).Pundits have always been willing to trumpet the end of warfare or the end of the relevance of power. Those of more sound mind and realistic outlook manage to keep things in perspective. It has been 65 years since the end of the last truly decisive global conflict -- and yet that conflict wasn't all that decisive as it ended with the dawn of the cold war between the West and the Soviet Union. Sixty-five years. Sure, there have been numerous "small wars" and regional conflicts. But keep in mind that it was almost 90 years between Napoleon's last gasp on the Continent and the outbreak of the First World War. Sure, there were numerous small wars and regional conflicts in between and many of them were not decisive. I'd also contend that the "conventional" war of World War I evolved beyond recognition from the conventional war of Napoleon and Wellington.I think the issue in our limited objective wars are as follows:1. The battle between isolationism and expansionism/imperialism that has raged in American government for over 200 years is still a vibrant as ever.2. Out goverment is increasingly being led by dilettantes and amateurs.3. Our National Command Authority and our executive military leaders have become ideologically bankrupt - we are drawn in too many different directions, and the ship is being steered by industry and dollars. 4. We've become too "tech-heavy" in our military strategy and doctrinal development. By that I mean that our military procurement efforts are driving doctrinal development when it should be the other way around. We should examine the wars and missions that our military anticipates fighting in the next 10 - 20 - 30 and 50 years and develop doctrine that will enable us to accomplish those missions and win those wars. Then that doctrine should drive tehcnological development and procurement. In reality, we develop some cool new technology and develop doctrine around the technology. Likewise, Congress and the Pentagon procure high dollar weapons systems not based on doctrinal or strategic needs, but based on whose congressional districts they are built in. Look at the JSF, the most recent tanker/refueling aircraft, or even the MV-22 Osprey - each in turn is manufactured and assembled from plants across the country. I think I read somewhere that the Osprey was constructed in something like 150 congressional districts. Then there are frequent news stories of Congress authorizing "X" numbers of some aircraft or weapons system that the Pentagon says that it doesn't want or need.5. We've lost our stomach for "right & wrong" - our society has enagaged in too much moral relativism. We were bound together as a society 9 years ago, but that resolve has fragmented. Yamamoto's Sleeping Giant was awakened and growled, but was afraid to crush those in it's path.Warfare is evolving, and our adversaries have evolved faster than we have at this point. They recognized their mission and their dilemma and developed a doctrine focused on accomplishing their mission - not based on what tools and weapons they had at their disposal. They analyzed our strengths and weaknesses and developed a strategy and doctrine to effectively attack our weakesses and avoid our strengths (sound like Sun Tzu?) and even turn our strength to their advantage (really sounds like Sun Tzu!).It will take a while, but we will have leaders that will rise to the occasion and reform and transform our doctrine and our National Command Authority relationships. "Conventional" warfare will evolve to meet the needs of nations and of adversaries. Historical perspecitve is needed when we analyze this evolution.
I would probably only classify the Korean War as a war for limited objectives. In the other post-WWII wars the US has fought war aims have generally been a moving target. In my opinion this is a major contributing factor to the inconclusiveness of the military effort involved. The US in particular, seems to get involved in wars because they seem like a good idea, not because there are any compelling geostrategic interests at stake. perhaps this lack of overt self-interest is also a contributing factor to the inconclusive nature of these wars.
One thing I wonder about – how does the RDF (Rapid Deployment Force) figure into this? My understanding (which may or may not be correct; I am not sure there is an official position on this) is that the RDF was created with two goals. One was to quickly overpower a small opponent and the other was to be able to place enough lives in jeopardy to legitimize the threat of nuclear weapons. That was certainly not stated openly by President Carter when he created the RDF, but I remember some pretty thinly veiled hints about what we would do to protect troops once they were on the ground. I know the specific unit has undergone much change over the years and may not even exist as an entity now, but the concept certainly does. We have the means to place enough American lives in danger anywhere in the world to make the threat to use nuclear force very real, so massing a large army as an invasion force is one conventional tactic that is not nearly as effective as it once was (or at least the certainty of the effectiveness is greatly diminished, if that makes any sense).
It is my understanding that the RDF no longer exists because the American military as whole is supposed to be “expeditionary“ now. Notice the satirical quotation marks. The military is big on everybody is special type thinking. That is why I have to wear a stupid beret I never wanted when I go to work every day. I would rather wear a helmet; hell, I would rather wear full battle rattle than a beret. That is not me in the beret BTW, it is me in battle rattle though from an article in Stars and Stripes and taken in 2005
Whether or not the unit exists isn't as important as the concept. There are a couple of countries in particular that have large enough populations to put together an invasion force that could overrun any of their neighbors (except maybe each other) in conventional warfare. If we threatened the use of nuclear weapons to stop such an assault, I am pretty sure it would be perceived as a bluff. We could not place enough troops in their way to make a difference in a traditional war. However, we could place enough in their way to make the threat of using nuclear weapons legitimate. I don't know if we have an official policy about what constitutes “stepping over the line” where we would respond with nuclear weapons, but there have been plenty of precedents since WWII to indicate we practice restraint when the conflict is between foreign powers on foreign soil. But putting several thousand American soldiers at risk would alter the equation dramatically. I am still not sure we would use the nuclear weapons, and it will probably come as no surprise that I actually hope we would not, but the threat would have to be taken seriously.
Do American troops have to be threatened to make the threat of the use of Nuclear Weapons credible? I don't think so. We put troops there as a symbol of resolve, not as sacrificial lambs.
Do American troops have to be threatened to make the threat of the use of Nuclear Weapons credible? I don't think so. We put troops there as a symbol of resolve, not as sacrificial lambs.
Exactly - we may be doing the semantic samba again. We will not let them be sacrificed and would not put them there unless we believe they can be effective and/or we are resolved to protect them by whatever means necessary. I do think that the threat of the use of nuclear weapons is only credible under a very select set of circumstances - a large number of American lives at stake either at home or abroad, the imminent threat of invasion of the US or our very close allies (Canada and the UK are the only absolutes, IMO, but there are others that are "maybes") or in retaliation for the use of a nuclear or similar (in terms of results in massive death and destruction) weapon against us. I am not saying that we wouldn't use it in other circumstances or that we always would in these, but I think that a foreign power would consider the threat very real under these circumstances and assume we are probably bluffing under other circumstances.
