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Vietnam left a great deal of unanswered questions. The most prominent, perhaps, being why the US was not able to win. It showed that, while the US possessed, without a doubt, the most capable military in the world, her soldiers and citizens could fall victim to manipulation and self doubt. I say this because one of the main sources of North Vietnamese intelligence came from prostitutes that American GIs visited and discussed military plans with, and because Ho Chin Minh was able to turn sections in the US population against the war.But, while these questions are commonly debated, we may need to focus more on the long term aftereffects that the war caused us. How has this war changed America? Did it battle harden and improve our forces? Did it damage our confidence? And how about our civilian population? What did the war do to them?
I think that the U.S. effectively was “winning” if you look at something like kill ratio, but obviously it did not “win” if we're talking about the larger point of war, which is the alteration of (geo)political powers. I think that the effects of Vietnam on America are still being determined. Yes, it has shaken the American populace's toleration of war, and this has been made manifest in some of the political and military choices made since then (the election of Obama, and the reason why Bush 1 did not attempt to pursue Sadaam Hussein in 1991). I think this is a bit different than the mere "shaking of confidence" within America. But definitely, Vietnam forced Americans to weigh with careful consideration the loss of life on one hand, and the immediate gains reaped from this loss of life on the other. While Americans may be able to tolerate the loss of life in retaliation against the Taliban in 2001, they have been less tolerant of the loss of life in Iraq due to the confusing nature of the short-term benefit that was achieved in return. Certainly, nothing even approaching the 50k lost in Vietnam would be permitted by the American populace now, unless the objectives were directly and immediately connected to something vital to America's existence.
1. A model for violent leftist protests against U.S. foreign policy. Led to a decline in patriotism and respect for our institutions such as anti-military, unpatriotic, flag burning activities by the left at every opportunity, either for ideology or cowardice. College demonstrations against the Vietnam war ended as soon as the draft ended. Draft dodgers became known as draft resisters and praised for it.3. Fear of another Vietnam.4. Presidents or advisors making military policy and getting yes-men generals and admirals to carry them out instead of asking for the best advice possible. Those who say no are forced to resign.5. Ending the draft which now gives us two generations of Americans, most of whom do not know what it is like to serve their country in an always dangerous world and younger leaders who have no concept of what the military is really like. And we have a military without the country being 100% behind them.6. Began the extreme ideological division among Americans.7. Led to the socialist Peace and Freedom Party slowly hijacking the Democratic party until it is now unrecognizeable from the Truman-JFK-LBJ era. From Cold War warriors to a Vichy mentality. 8. Types like Jane Fonda were not prosecuted for giving aid and comfort to the enemy simply because Congress did not formally declare war -- thus blurring the line between dissent and treason. 9. Pentagon papers set the model for newspapers more often leaking military strategy and tactics -- although an isolationist Senator did the same thing a few days before WWII.10. Walter Cronkite and the media turned against the war and set the model for a disloyal press and perhaps disloyal Senators like Harry 'We lost The War" Reid and Durban who compared our military to Nazis and prisons to Soviet Gulags.I could go on for pages. One of my best friends was the late Col. Raymond F. Toliver, Historian for the Fighter Aces Association, and author of 5 books on fighter aces, commanded the 20th fighter wing in the 1950s in England, and served as an aide to Curtis LeMay before going to the Pentagon. Over several decades, he told me much about the leadup to the war. In 1953 he was in Indo-China with Wild Bill Donovan's fact-finding group that told Eisenhower never to commit land forces in SE Asia. He advised the French Air Force at Dienbenphiu, and they did not follow his advice. He refused a jump to Major General if he would help plan air war against the Viet Cong -- he was forced out of the military in 1965 because he disagreed with Pentagon policy and official lying about casualties and body counts. In Toliver's opinion, McNamara is the greatest traitor in U.S. History. He believed we could fight a war on the cheap and essentially ordered the military to follow his plans. And the Harvard "whiz-kids" in the administration were anti-military.Off topic a bit --Toliver's last assignment in the military was to advise the Saudis how to defend against a possible attack from ..... Iraq. That was in 1965.
I think that the biggest legacies of the war consisted of the willingness of our national command authority to commit us to a military action:1. Without establishing clearly defined success criteria (President G.H.W. Bush got it right for Desert Shield/Desert Storm and was taken to task for it).2. Without mobilizing (and maintaining) popular support and involvement in the war / war effort3. While keeping it a secondary concern/priority to domestic and social policy.Another concern, from my limited viewpoint, is that we failed to coordinate military strategy with national policy. Our participation in the Vietnam war was a logistical masterpiece, coupled with a flawed military strategy. Winning what LBJ called "this piss-ant little war" was never a top national priority. As a result, military options were limited (in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam) where we could not go after the enemy (the NVA) in a way to destroy his ability and will to fight. So, instead, we turned to fighting a counter-insurgency. In a weird and somewhat ironic twist of fate, we largely won the counter-insurgency but that victory was totally irrelevant because we didn't defeat the NVA. We directed our main effort against the enemy's deception plan, so to speak... which had very little to do with our national policy of containing communism. To put it another way, our goal / desired end state was not to defeat the North, it was to preserve the South. That's akin to fighting not to lose rather than fighting to win.
I think that the U.S. effectively was "winning" if you look at something like kill ratio, but obviously it did not "win" if we're talking about the larger point of war, which is the alteration of (geo)political powers. I think that the effects of Vietnam on America are still being determined. Yes, it has shaken the American populace's toleration of war, and this has been made manifest in some of the political and military choices made since then (the election of Obama, and the reason why Bush 1 did not attempt to pursue Sadaam Hussein in 1991). I think this is a bit different than the mere "shaking of confidence" within America. But definitely, Vietnam forced Americans to weigh with careful consideration the loss of life on one hand, and the immediate gains reaped from this loss of life on the other. While Americans may be able to tolerate the loss of life in retaliation against the Taliban in 2001, they have been less tolerant of the loss of life in Iraq due to the confusing nature of the short-term benefit that was achieved in return. Certainly, nothing even approaching the 50k lost in Vietnam would be permitted by the American populace now, unless the objectives were directly and immediately connected to something vital to America's existence.
So the current administration and the mess in Iraq are both long term influences of Vietnam. This is a very deep analysis; it looks like you?ve really thought about it. And yes, 58 000 American casualties compared to the 1 100 000 North Vietnamese, not to mention the non-military casualties indicates that the US was winning. I?d like to add, though, that the liberation of Kuwait and the original overpowering of the Taliban would not have been nearly as rapid if the American army hadn?t had the experiences of Vietnam under their belt. A lot of classroom hours are spent studying the tactics used by the Viet Cong, and how to counter them. So, while we now have less tolerance for loss of life, we also know how to preserve it more, and have better ways to come up with quick victories. Donroc, were you there? Your answer sounds very similar to what a lot of veterans I?ve spoken with have said. They felt cheated and betrayed. The reasons why are obvious, and make me wonder how many people are psychologically still there. Lee Bai wrote that soldiers can never leave the battlefield after the war is over. I sometimes talk to younger people and am thrown back at the importance they put on clothing, popularity and celebrities, while feeling that national defense is something to be taken for granted because someone else will deal with it. Yeah, ending the draft hurt us more than anyone anticipated. Vulture, I?d like to add something to your comments. We need to be more weary of locals in foreign lands. An interest in North American language, culture and technology, doesn?t equal an ally. As we found out in Vietnam, many apparently simple and harmless looking people want to get to know us to find our weaknesses because they either envy North American dominance or want to defeat us. And, gentlemen, casual acquaintances need to be taken more seriously. When you consider the children from American fathers that were left behind, and the discrimination and abuse they faced, not to mentioned the way they were used as tickets into the US, only to be dumped after green cards were acquired, I hope young service men today are all aware of that.
So the current administration and the mess in Iraq are both long term influences of Vietnam. This is a very deep analysis; it looks like you?ve really thought about it. And yes, 58 000 American casualties compared to the 1 100 000 North Vietnamese, not to mention the non-military casualties indicates that the US was winning. I?d like to add, though, that the liberation of Kuwait and the original overpowering of the Taliban would not have been nearly as rapid if the American army hadn?t had the experiences of Vietnam under their belt. A lot of classroom hours are spent studying the tactics used by the Viet Cong, and how to counter them. So, while we now have less tolerance for loss of life, we also know how to preserve it more, and have better ways to come up with quick victories.
I'm not entirely clear on the tone of your post, but I was merely mentioning how the effects of Vietnam are still being played out in America. I would say that it's clear that Vietnam has shaped public opinion even down to today, and examples of this can likely be seen in George H.W. Bush's decision not to continue on into Baghdad in 1991, as well as in the public backlash against George W. Bush in 2008 which led to Obama's election. I'm sure there are plenty more examples, particularly in the 70s and 80s, but these two stick out in more recent times.
My apologies, Phidippides, if my tone wasn't clear. I'm new to this type of forum discussion. I'm learning a great deal and just trying to contribute back in any way I can. I hope you'll bear with me and as time goes by I'll learn to post better.
I will only contribute this piece, because I think the Vietnam War itself has less bearing on what the public perceives of the “Legacy of the Vietnam War” than events that happened in the states during the war itself. It was not the military aspect of the war but the social effects at home that have left such deep scars from Vietnam. My dad has told about being spit on when he flew into Oakland in 1969 after his first tour. That sentiment is not gone from America but it is not as prevalent. In 2007 I was flying in the US on official business in uniform and a young woman, probably early 20's, in the Atlanta airport asked me how it felt to kill innocent people, I assumed it was because A, I was in uniform, and B, I have both a combat patch and the Combat Action badge. At first I was taken aback and struck speechless, then I regained my composure and being a little bit angry told her I had never deliberately killed an innocent person but that I did get a deep satisfaction from killing those that attacked me or my unit then continued to walk through the terminal. My response left her speechless and a few minutes later she caught up to me and accused me of being a murderer again. At that point I was tired of it and a crowd was beginning to gather because she was so loud. I turned and regarded her silently for a second, and then told her that I would refuse to engage in a debate with her because she obviously had her mind made up. I then told her she was welcome for the freedoms that military personnel like myself provide because it was certain that the Taliban would have shut her up in the house and beaten her for getting out of her place. about 20 or so of the 30 people around us clapped at my response and I turned and walked to the gate for my connecting flight. Several people followed me to the gate and shook my hand thanking me for my service, this actually made me the most uncomfortable, I do not serve to be congratulated; I serve because I love my country, my family has a military tradition dating to the revolution, and was taught by my father( a 23 year veteran) that every young American man should give back to their country. What I really wanted to do was find that woman's parents and kick their a@# for not raising their kid right, there is something wrong when a person has more compassion for their enemies and only contempt and derision for those defending them. That is not the only incident of that sort I have experienced since 9/11 but it is he most memorable.
I?d like to add, though, that the liberation of Kuwait and the original overpowering of the Taliban would not have been nearly as rapid if the American army hadn?t had the experiences of Vietnam under their belt. A lot of classroom hours are spent studying the tactics used by the Vietcong, and how to counter them.
I have been in the military for over 21 years as a Combat Arms soldier and I am here to tell you that prior to the start of the insurgency in late 2003 there was no training or classroom work done with regular line soldiers on counterinsurgency and no doctrine was propagated prior to the publication of the new COIN manual in 2005. We made it up as we went along in 2003-2005. No doubt we made plenty of mistakes but I think we did quite well given the conditions we worked under and that we were fighting a war none of us had trained for.That is my 2?.
Jake, a few things here I don't really agree with.
So, while we now have less tolerance for loss of life, we also know how to preserve it more, and have better ways to come up with quick victories.
If you're equating our experience in VN with Iraq or Afghanistan, it doesn't seem like we learned anything. And both those latter wars are hardly quick victories.
Vulture, I?d like to add something to your comments. We need to be more weary of locals in foreign lands. An interest in North American language, culture and technology, doesn?t equal an ally.
I think it's the opposite. It's not the locals' interest in our culture, it's the other way around that wins allies. Sunni Awakening for example.
The Civil War and Vietnam are the two biggest scars on this nation. Their impact will never not be felt so long as this nation endures. They remain the two best examples of how divided this nation can be. 911 is the third biggest scar, but it served more to unite than divide, but it's impact will never be forgotten either.
Jake, I did not serve in Vietnam — too old — but at the time I was in a state of total pissed-off by the failure of our govt. to fight the war properly, the disloyal press and too many of our population, and the elitist disrespect our draftees and volunteers received. Of that college age generation, I have no respect for them if they did not serve on active duty, and I still question many of the degrees they received ca 1965-1975. I remember one instance in which students at U.C. Davis were given A's for lying on railroad tracks to prevent military shipments.
I have been in the military for over 21 years as a Combat Arms soldier and I am here to tell you that prior to the start of the insurgency in late 2003 there was no training or classroom work done with regular line soldiers on counterinsurgency and no doctrine was propagated prior to the publication of the new COIN manual in 2005. We made it up as we went along in 2003-2005. No doubt we made plenty of mistakes but I think we did quite well given the conditions we worked under and that we were fighting a war none of us had trained for.That is my 2?.
Everyone's experience is different - we did what could be counterinsurgency training when I first went in the Corps in the early/mid 1980s. Our senior battalion officers and SNCOs were all Vietnam vets, so perhaps that shaped our focus. In the early 1990s we also studied and tried to implement the lessons of the Marine Combined Action Platoons from Vietnam - as well as studying the Marine Corps' old "Small Wars Manual" --- both of which were key components of the modern COIN manual. Now, was this widespread? I doubt it. But that was my experience.
So the current administration and the mess in Iraq are both long term influences of Vietnam. This is a very deep analysis; it looks like you?ve really thought about it.
A couple of other thoughts -- our country and our military are products of our history. The expertise in logistics and deployment that we witnessed in the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan can trace their roots back through every conflict we've had in the 20th Century - largely back to the logistical debacles associated with our invasion of Cuba in the Spanish American War at the end of the 19th Century.The execution of precision bombing that we witnessed in the first Gulf War and in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan had their roots in precision targeting efforts in bombing North Vietnam, but can easily be traced to an outgrowth from the strategic bombing campaigns and dive bombers of the Second World War.And the "body count tallies" of Vietnam can largely be traced to previous conflicts - in particular the campaigns against Japan in the Second World War where the influence was on "killing them all" because they wouldn't surrender and couldn't escape.
And yes, 58 000 American casualties compared to the 1 100 000 North Vietnamese, not to mention the non-military casualties indicates that the US was winning.
Now, this is what is at the core of my first post in this thread -- focusing on the body count and casualty totals is largely irrelevant. It's like counting strikeouts in a baseball game -- of the 27 outs per side in a game, we struck out 25 batters and they only struck out 5 of ours. But that's irrelevant to how many runs are scored. We largely defeated the insurgency an defeated the Viet Cong - and we soundly defeated the North Vietnamese Army in practically every major engagement - but we failed to prevent them from winning the war. How many of the enemy killed is irrelevant if it doesn't degrade their ability and will to fight. Clausewitz said that war is an extension of politics (policy) by other means -- in the case of our involvement in Vietnam, we fought on the ground, but we failed to understand that the "other means" that Clausewitz was referring to extends well beyond just firefights, armies, and battles.
Thank you for your replies, gentlemen. They are insightful, but I have to challenge a few things. I have been in the military for over 21 years as a Combat Arms soldier and I am here to tell you that prior to the start of the insurgency in late 2003 there was no training or classroom work done with regular line soldiers on counterinsurgency and no doctrine was propagated prior to the publication of the new COIN manual in 2005. We made it up as we went along in 2003-2005. No doubt we made plenty of mistakes but I think we did quite well given the conditions we worked under and that we were fighting a war none of us had trained for.That is my 2?.Scout, during my time as a military engineer we studied the tactics of the Viet Cong up and down, since their booby traps were cunning and effective. They managed to realize that placing a bomb under a pile of manure with a wooden stick at the top meant that American soldiers would kick the stick while Vietnamese boys would walk right past it. This is just one example, there were many more, but the point is, that if there are commanding officers out there who aren't teaching based on Vietnam then their men should be asking them to or should take it upon themselves to learn.Now, Vulture, how can you say that 58000 casualties compared to over a million is irrelevant? If you want to compare this to baseball, then I'd say we were striking them out more, scoring more runs cause we won all the major battles, and we had them on the ropes. We had to forfeit the game, but that doesn't make this irrelevant. What we need to look at is why the Vietnamese were willing to take that type of liking and keep coming back for more. I'll tell you why; because they knew we would not do the same. That is what we have to change. Otherwise, when the next Vietnam comes, and it's only a matter of time until it does, we'll be beaten before we start. This may be the whole reason the Taliban don't let up. There are political and other problems in the west, but if the Vietnamese were able to overcome their circumstances to win that war, why can't we overcome our obstacles?Now, yes, the scars are deep, and there are stupid people in society like that woman at the airport, but I hope that people reading this thread come out of it with the knowledge that to die fighting for what you believe in is far better than to do it in an old age home, especially if the conditions in that home are dictated by foreign countries. Skiguy, I agree that we have to learn about other cultures to make allies. But, as you can tell, I'm on a different time zone from you all. I'm in Asia, where I see a lot of locals asking foreigners details about their cultures while smiling, but their intent is to find weaknesses to be used against the west later on.
Jake – I guess my metaphor was a little off. My main point is that we weren't fighting the war in a way aimed at defeating the North Vietnamese. We were fighting it – on a strategic level – to not lose to them. U.S. strategy was focused largely on defeating the Viet Cong, and when they showed up in unit strength, the NVA. In no way do I want to minimize the casualties, as each one was a personal tragedy. My comment on irrelevance was meant on the basis of evaluating success criteria. Under Johnson/MacNamara/Westmoreland we evidently identified the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese critical vulnerability as their inability to replace losses and maintain troop strenghts in the field. In the case of the VC, I think that they were right. In the case of the NVA – well, evidently they were wrong given their inability to go after them in North Vietnam.
