Jake - I guess my metaphor was a little off.  My main point is that we weren't fighting the war in a way aimed at defeating the North Vietnamese.  We were fighting it - on a strategic level - to not lose to them.  U.S. strategy was focused largely on defeating the Viet Cong, and when they showed up in unit strength, the NVA.  In no way do I want to minimize the casualties, as each one was a personal tragedy.  My comment on irrelevance was meant on the basis of evaluating success criteria.  Under Johnson/MacNamara/Westmoreland we evidently identified the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese critical vulnerability as their inability to replace losses and maintain troop strenghts in the field.  In the case of the VC, I think that they were right.  In the case of the NVA - well, evidently they were wrong given their inability to go after them in North Vietnam.

Seems to me the VC/NVA were readily able to replenish their losses given the kill ratio.  Don't forget the fact that they were able to do this going back to their war with the French.  I don't think the North Vietnamese even cared how many they lost since they had so many bodies to throw at us.