History would have played out different – perhaps radically differently – had Alexander the Great decided to set his sights on lands to the west, rather than fighting the Persians to the east. Had he done so, he inevitably would have come up against a burgeoning militaristic Roman Republic which had made gains but had yet to conquer the entire Italian peninsula. So had the Hellenic League/Macedonians met the Romans on the battlefield, who would have won? And more importantly, what would the broad effects have been on world history? Thoughts?
I would tend to argue that the Romans would have beaten Alexander's army. Even the 4th Century BC legion was more maneuverable and flexible than the Sarissa armed phalanx of Macedon and Alexander's companion cavalry could not have been so decisive in the closer terrain of western as they were in the deserts of the east.
Hannibal was able to play havoc with the vaunted Roman legions. Alexander would have adapted his tactics to match the Romans. It would have been a hotly contested war.
Hannibal was able to play havoc with the vaunted Roman legions.
Yet he still couldn't beat them. What does that tell you about how good Hannibal really was?That begs another question. Why are so many military leaders held up as great who were defeated? Hannibal, Napoleon, Manstein, and Guderian come immediately to mind. They may have been good but not great. Great leaders do not go down to defeat.
While I don't think it's as easy as saying a>b, b>c, therefore a>c, it is interesting to note that even after the Republic had achieved greatness, it still lost to the Parthians (Persians) at Carhae in 53 B.C. Of course, Alexander rammed through a Persian force of 120,000 some 250+ years earlier. Different times, and different situations, yes, but perhaps a face off between the two great empires could have gone either way.
Lee was the greatest of the Civil War generals even in defeat. Had he the resources that the North had, he could have won the war in a reasonably short amount of time. Instead, he had to rely on cunning and tactics to draw the conflict out as long as he could, which he did quite successfully.
Donnie, both your examples of Lee and Hannibal prove the point that many military historians make about the big battalions. Perhaps the apocryphal quote from Stalin is right and "quantity has a quality all its own."Let us talk battlefield tactics. Alexander beat Darius because he used his companion cavalry to go after the Persian command group and force a decision. The bulk of Alexander's army fought what was essentially a holding action while Alexander and his Companions cut off the head. The Alexandrian phalanx was a blunt instrument that defeated the geeks with better weapons and determination but little tactical finesse. The Macedonians still came straight on phalanx on phalanx. The Macedonian phalanx was not articulated at all.The Early republican legion was not a solid phalanx; it was articulated phalanx, although not truly manipular as under Caesar. The fact remains that the Roman phalanx could actually move on the battlefield where the Macedonians could only go straight ahead. Any deviation by the Macedonians meant defeat as their phalanx lost cohesion and ceased being an army and started being a mob.Both of Hannibal’s great victories over the Romans at Trasimene and Cannae are battles where he used either terrain or formation to cause the Roman army to lose its cohesion. At Trasimene he backed them into the water at Cannae he compressed their formation.The Roman phalanxes would have defeated Alexander by flanking his phalanx. In fact, that is what they did to the Greeks 200 years later and those Greeks were fighting in the Macedonian style. Explain to me how the Alexandrian army would have defeated the Roman legion?Lastly, the Parthians and Persians are two different peoples who fought completely differently. The Parthians never managed to inflict a decisive defeat on the Romans either. Carrhae does not count because the Parthians could not follow it up. A victory without exploitation is no true victory. The Parthians could not exploit their victory at Carrhae any more than Hannibal could exploit Trasimene or Cannae. The Parthian fighting style was perfect for the steppe and desert where the Roman fighting style was perfect for mountain and forest. Heck, even Pyrrhus of Epirus could not beat the Romans.If Alexander had turned West, he would have been the guy who took his father’s magnificent army and wasted it and been no more than a historical footnote.
The Roman phalanxes would have defeated Alexander by flanking his phalanx. In fact, that is what they did to the Greeks 200 years later and those Greeks were fighting in the Macedonian style. Explain to me how the Alexandrian army would have defeated the Roman legion?
The precise difference between the Romans fighting the Hellenic league in the 320s B.C. compared to the Greeks fighting the Romans 200 years later is, of course, the absence of Alexander. If an objection is made about the Parthians not being able to "follow it up", we can estimate that Alexander would not have had this same problem. Further, by the 320s B.C. Rome still had only a handful of victories outside Latium. Alexander therefore would have probably had the advantage of more skilled men accustomed to fighting in different theaters of war.
What was it that Napoleon said? I'd rather face an army of lions led by a rabbit than an army of rabbits led by a lion…or something to that effect. Alexander was a lion of lions and his army would have followed him to hell if necessary just like the Army of Northern Virginia did Lee and the Carthaginians did Hannibal. Rome might have had the better “system” but if their generals could not command the undying loyalty and faith that the Greeks did with Alexander, they might not have fared too well. Alexander would have adapted and overcome his enemy with his tactical genius just like Hannibal did.
Donnie, Rome did command the undying loyalty of it's soldiers. I think there is something about the died in the wool southerner that actually likes lost causes. It is the only explanation I can come up with for why they idolize what were in the end losers, such as Lee and Hannibal. Of course, Napoleon was also a loser who did not know when to stop either.I will simply point out Lee’s greatest mistake and one that historians have rightly pointed to as the point when the South lost the war: that is allowing Pickett’s charge to happen. There is no argument you can make on military merit for Pickett’s Charge. You can argue por communication or order transmittal, or bad intel. The fact remains however that if Pickett was acting within Lee’s intent and there is every indication that he was then Lee was horrible at the tactical art. Given that the South lost the artillery battle, sending men across that field was tantamount to murder as they were open to being atritted the whole way and any who gained Union lines would not be strong enough to make a breach and hold it until Reb support got there. A horrible decision that wasted veteran troops who could have been put to good use later in the war.Phid, do you really think a solid phalanx could defeat an articulated one? I would like to hear the explanation for how that would work tactically. Especially given that Greek tactics consisted of trying to break the enemy phalanx which the Romans already had done by the way they organized. The Roman legion arrayed for battle in a manner guaranteed to break the continuity of any solid phalanx attacking their front, such a break being the death knell for a solid phalanx.We can estimate that after the appalling losses Alexander would have suffered in any victory over Rome he could not have followed it up in time to stop Rome from raising another army. If Hannibal couldn’t do that what makes you think Alexander could. Romans under the republic did not fight for their Consuls, they fought for Rome. The Romans showed that they were more than willing to raise new armies when theirs were destroyed, why would the do any different when fighting Alexander.
What was it that Napoleon said? I'd rather face an army of lions led by a rabbit than an army of rabbits led by a lion...or something to that effect. Alexander was a lion of lions and his army would have followed him to hell if necessary just like the Army of Northern Virginia did Lee and the Carthaginians did Hannibal. Rome might have had the better "system" but if their generals could not command the undying loyalty and faith that the Greeks did with Alexander, they might not have fared too well. Alexander would have adapted and overcome his enemy with his tactical genius just like Hannibal did.
This is kind of what I was alluding to. I'm not sure the Macedonians/Hellenic armies would have been as successful sans Alexander, everything else being equal.Scout, did the Romans even use the articulated phalanx in the 330s B.C.? I have found a few sources (e.g. Fighting Techniques of the Ancient World (3000 B.C. to 500 A.D.): Equipment .../Rob S. Rice, Simon Anglim, et. al.) which say that it was the Macedonians who (seem to have) developed the articulated phalanx in the early third century B.C. as a response to the inherent weakness of the solid phalanx. This indicates, at the least, that post-Alexandrian generals knew the weakness of their main formation and were adapting their tactics through successive wars - something we can debate about whether Alexander had done had he met the Romans.As for the Romans, I have found a couple of sources (e.g. The Roman Army: A Social and Institutional History/Pat Southern) which discuss what they used in the mid-fourth century B.C., as indicated by Livy (though his account, written several centuries later, has been doubted). The Roman formation of this time consisted of legions in three battle lines consisting of two to three troop types in each. This is the type of troop formation that has been suggested was used in the wars with the Samnites, meaning it is the formation Alexander would most likely have faced. Also of note is that this may have been a formation type tailored to hilly terrain, since it is said the Samnites did not want to fight on the plains. Whether this would have been effective against Alexander on a different terrain type is more of an open question.At the end of the day, though, I have no idea who would have won between Alexander and the Romans. You could be right, but it's an interesting question to ponder.
Lee allowed Pickett's charge because he was battle fatigued. His judgment was clouded because he hadn't had any rest and he was grief stricken over how many men had died under his command. He thought he had nearly broken the Union lines on the second day and that they would not have expected an assault up the middle. Longstreet begged him not to do it, but Lee was too tired to debate it. Had Lee been better rested, he probably would have tried another assault on the flanks, and if it failed again, he would have retreated like he normally would. He was smitten with the idea of taking the war to the North to expedite a peace by hopefully causing Lincoln to lose the election. In a nutshell it was a high risk/reward gambit. Lee was getting desperate by then too.