Give me Lee's leadership with Grant's army.

I'm of a different opinion:  That Lee is overrated and Grant underrated.Lee was a brilliant tactician, but used the (Napoleonic) tactics of the past.  Grant was a brilliant strategist, who developed tactics of the future.  When Grant became the supreme commander he moved armies in a coordinated manner so the actiions of each army benefited the other armies under Grant's command as well as contributed to the success of an all encompassing strategy.  Lee held a similar position, but never tried to move armies in a manner that one helped another or an all encompassing strategy. In the Civil War, the defense had significant advantages.  Twice Lee tried to invade Northern territory and failed both times.  Grant, however, successfully invaded the South in both the West and the East.Grant’s victories moved the North ever closer to ultimate victory.  Lee’s victories lacked similar long term gains—they only served to prolong the war.

Lee never had command of more than the Army of Northern Virginia. 

Not long before the war ended Lee became General-in-Chief of the Confederate armies.  It was a position similar to that Grant held as Lieutenant General and Lee, like Grant, had supreme command over all the armies of his nation. (If the Confederacy can properly be termed a nation).IMHO Lee's promotion (which he reluctantly accepted) as the commanding general came so late in the war for it to have made no difference in the war's outcome.  That being said, Lee never tried (unlike Grant) to co-ordinate the actions of the various armies to assist one another.  Unlike Grant, Lee lacked the vision of what strategic cooperation between armies could accomplished. To the best of my knowledge, Lee (unlike Grant) never tried to do anything as a general in chief--which is probably why it is not generally known he held such a position.

Because of the nature of the Confederate commanders Lee probably could not have coordinated his activities with other theaters even if he had wanted to.  Confederate generals were much more resistant to central authority than Union Generals.  Just look at the problems Davis had with the army of the Tennessee during the Atlanta campaign.  Johnston just did his own thing.

As the war progressed Davis lost respect and Lee gained it.  As I recall the Confederate Congress passed Lee's request allowing blacks to serve as soldiers because they couldn't deny Lee anything.  If other commanders would have obeyed anyone it would have been Lee.  Both because of his hero status and his accomplishments on the battlefield.There were other problems that would have made it more difficult for Lee to have acted as a supreme commander than Grant.  One of these was the North had more miles of railroad track than did the South.However, I still feel the number one reason Lee did not function as a supreme commander is he lacked Grant's vision of what a supreme commander could accomplish.

The Confederacy was doomed as soon as they fired on Ft Sumter, the only question was how long.

I agree the South lacked the resources to win a protracted war. Perhaps, however, the South could have won by using a different strategy or if the things had gone differently before Lincoln defeated McClellan.The Buchanan Administration transferred most of the contents of Northern armories south before Lincoln took office.  Winfield Scott's favoritism resulted in Southern officers being better trained--and holding higher positions--than those from the North.  So at the beginning of the war the South actually had more material and a better officer corps.As I see it there were some ways the South could have won.  The first was by invading the North after Bull Run.  A successful invasion might have led the North to sue for peace.  This was, of course, contrary to the will of Jefferson Davis, and IMHO was a huge mistake on his part.  (It resulted, I think, from his belief that not invading the North was necessary to gain the support of England and France.  Another major mistake by Davis and something that Lincoln made impossible by emancipating the slaves.)The second--which the South tried--was by making the North grow war weary and abandon the struggle.  This stratagem almost worked.  Had McClellan defeated Lincoln the South would have gained its independence.  But Northern victories shortly before the election--especially those of Sherman--thwarted that hope.    Also, had Lincoln been assassinated before his second election things might have been different.  As I see it, much of the resolve that kept the North in the war came directly from Lincoln.    As I see it, the South came closer to winning than is usually thought.  Had it not been for Northern victories--which in some ways were nearly miraculous--just before the election McClellan would have beat Lincoln resulting in the South gaining its independence.  (Had Davis not replaced Johnson with Hood the whole outcome of the war might have been different.)