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I personally believe it was the Phalanx. Alexander was able to conquer nearly all of the known world using it.
I would have to do some research, but I think some of the early U.S. airships were capable of carrying fixed wing aircraft. The Shanandoa comes to mind.
rldowns3 wrote:Germany’s first and foremost mistake even before the war began was Hitlers interference in the war planning. He thought he knew it all and was an arrogant egotist when he didn’t know jack squat about war tactics.
Second mistake was they relied on an idiot that didn't know how to fight a war either, Mousolini.
Good points. Kinda like the blind leading the blind if you asked me. In many ways each was a brilliant and brutal politician, but neither was blessed with a mind for military thinking.Yep, all true. Gen. Giap spilled the beans on French tv. Parts of the interview were also shown in the documentary “Vietnam, the 10,000 day war” shown on PBS in the early 1980’s. Gen. Giap recounted his defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu as well as the battles against the U.S. at Hue and Khe Sahn. Guess which part of the French interview was NOT part of the “10,000 day war” documentary?
Gen. Giap and Minister Van Thiew squelched the discussion within the Parliment, but it does point out how badly we hurt the north while the libs and anti war protesters were screaming that babies were being killed by the bombing. Unrestricted bombing of the north as well as Laos and Cambodia would have shut down the Ho Chi Mihn trail and totally disabled North Vietnam's capacity to wage war. The reasons that we did'nt were twofold. We had promised Thailand that we would not use bases in that country (Khorat, Nakhon Pathom and Utapao) to bomb Vietnam, and remember Thailand had signed treaties within ASEAN. Second, the Paris peace accords prohibited U.S. involvement in Cambodia and Laos.
If only we knew then what we know now?In a large measure, I agree with your theories on Hitler’s gamble at Kursk and Stalingrad. He was looking for a propaganda victory against the Soviets when a military victory should have been foremost in his mind. Allowing the Russians to rebuild tank and aircraft factories behind the Ural mountains was also a very big mistake.
My major point about the battles of Kursk and Stalingrad were simply that Germany could have destroyed larger portions of the Red Army if they stuck to the formulas that had worked in the past. Attacking a defense in depth like the one at Kursk was not something the Germans could afford because the advantage always lies with the defender. A more efficient use of German manpower and weaponry would have been to encircle the defensive lines at Kursk and cut them off from their source of supply while engaging other Soviet units in maneuver warfare. A deper penetration of the Russian homeland and the seizure of new airfeilds may also have brought the new tank factories you mentioned within reach of the Luftwaffe bomber force.
If we concentrate on the reasons for the German defeat in Russia, I tend to think these are the most important.
1. The brutal treatment of Russia's civilian population. If the Germans had given the Ukranians rifles and a train ride west instead of a bullet to the back of the head or a train ride east, things would have turned out differently.
2. Germany prepared for another "Lightning War' and were ill equipped for long campaign in Russia. The lack of winter uniforms and equipment became critical that first year.
3. Germany could not strike deep into the heart of Russia at the new factories because the entire Luftwaffe was composed of short and medium range bombers and fighters. While the U.S. and British Air Forces pounded German factories, rail yards and submarine pens, Germany could not do the same to it's enemies.
4. Germany never considered the logistical requirements of an army 2000 miles from home and was unable to meet it's army's needs. Fuel, ammunition, rations and spare parts were always in short supply.
5. Hitler allowed peacetime products and production rates at the German factories and waited far to long into the war to shift Germany to 100% wartime production. The Armies in the field used war materials as fast as they could be produced and Germany never had an available stockpile to draw from nearly the entire war.
6. In a long, protracted war of attrition, Germany was bound to lose against Russia simply because of the numbers. Germanys only hope was a rapid victory within 6 months of the initial invasion.I think you have most of it right. The political situation in South Vietnam was very unstable before 1968 and we were really messed up for backing Diem and his family as well as fighting the Vietcong on top of the NVA.
After January of 1968, the Vietcong were not a viable fighting force on the ground and the spy network that they had in place was almost wiped out by the Phoenix program. When Diem was overthrown and the Thiew's new goverment installed, corruption was still there, but not as rampant and officers within the ARVN were no longer appointed because they had family connections, but were promoted according to their performance on the battlefield.
Also after 1968, the war shifted from a guerilla war by mostly Vietcong units, to a major ground war against the NVA. Our armed forces are much better suited to this type of warfare and we satarted to whupass.
During the Christmas bombing campaign of 1972, the North Vietnamese POL supplies were destroyed as well as nearly all of their anti-aircraft defenses. The North Vietnamese Goverment actually discussed an UNCONDITIONAL surrender to the U.S., but decided against it knowing we would call another halt to the bombing in order to negotiate. If the bombing had continued another 72 hours, the Goverment of North Vietnam would have capitulated and the war would have been won. The bombing damaged the infrastructure so badly that the food distribution system in the north basically shut down due to lack of fuel and the blowing of nearly all the bridges. Even the North Vietnamese Goverment admitted that many people around Hanoi starved that winter, and that a humanitarian crisis was narrowly avoided. Thats how close we came. Several key leaders of the north admitted this to the world in interviews on French Television in the mid 1970's.
Is it any wonder that the left has less to say about a period of the war when we were starting to win against a visible opponent? Is it any wonder that the leftist media never tells the public that the bombing they railed against nearly defeated the enemy? If there is one thing you can count on with the left, it is that they will omit anything that goes against their agenda.The reason that I tend to think that Westmoreland was inept has to do with the career path that U.S. Army Officers go through in their development. They may choose (or are chosen for) broad career feilds;
Infantry
Artillery
Armor
Aviation
Quartermaster
etc.
The overwhelming majority of the top officers in the Pentagon come from the West Point/Infantry branch. The ringknockers have had things locked up in the General staff since before the Civil War.
Now when the majority of your training concerns straight Infantry/conventional combat, ie. WWII type Infantry/Armor/Artillery fighting, you tend to go with what you know. In other words, when all you have is a hammer, everything begins to look like a nail. Very few officers in the U.S. military recieve training in unconventional warfare. Fewer still really have an understanding of it and can properly apply U.S. forces to counter this type of threat.
This is not the first war that the U.S. has battled it out with enemy unconventional/guerilla forces. The Infantry officers in charge continue to use conventional tools in an unconventional role, and they cannot seem to figure out why things dont go their way.
These are just the larger wars we have had to fight against guerillas.
1. The Indian wars. Men like Geronimo tied up huge Cav units by using unconventional hit and run tactics.
2. The Philippine Insurection. Muslim jurimentado's terrorized U.S. forces for over 10 years before they were defeated.
3. WWII. Muslim guerillas formed by the Germans with the aid of the Gran Mufti of Jerusalem in 1943-44. These bands were formed late in the war across north Africa and even into the Baltics. German Werewolf units were also placed behind Allied lines in Europe and did huge damage to the Allied war effort. Otto Skorzeny and his units dressed as U.S. soldiers during the Battle of the Bulge comes to mind.
4. Korean conflict. Communist insurgents left behind the lines after the Inchon landings. When they realized that they were cut off, small bands of North Korean soldiers simply cast off their uniforms and blended in with the flow of refugees. These groups were especially active around Osan and Teagu during the war, disrupting supply lines and communications. Some of these cells are still believed to be active in South Korea today.
5. Vietnam and the Indochina war. The Vietcong were experts at hit and run tactics, never standing their ground against larger U.S. Infantry units. Instead, ambush, raids, sniping and bombings were their tools. The leadership in North Vietnam decided to sacrifice the Viet Cong during Tet in an effort to aid the North Vietnamese Army, but until that time, they outsmarted the best U.S officers. Conventional infantry tactics against guerilla's cost the U.S. dearly.
6. Iraq. Al-Quida learned the hard way in both Afghanistan and Iraq that they cannot win against us in an open fight. They resorted to the only effective method open to them, guerilla warfare. Fallujah was the last time they dared to stand and fight, and you can bet they wont make that mistake again. Ambushes, mines and bombs have become their tools and we have not properly adapted to this.
We seem hell bent on letting the conventional infantry officers do it all over again.
Westy had things well in hand against the NVA, but the Viet Cong had him in a bind. The best book out there that supports my theory is "A bright and shining lie, John Paul Van and America in Vietnam". If you can find a copy, Robin Moore's book "The Green Berets" is a masterpiece and will be one of the best books you will ever read. Of Course, old DWS though different, but I'm convinced I'm right.I agree with KJ that Vietnam is just a catchphrase used by the left. However, I would like to give everyone here some food for thought as far as military strategy and tactics are concerned. In this text, I think there are many comparisons that can be made between the two wars.
Gen. William Westmoreland attempted to fight the communist forces by search and destroy and conventional military tactics. Basically chasing enemy units around the countryside and turning the entire country into a war zone. Large infantry and armor units moved about the countryside in an effort to find, fix and destroy the enemy. U.S.A.F. close air support was used to destroy large pockets of resistance and bomb suspected marshalling areas. Artillery fire bases were placed on major hill masses and fired in support of maneuvering ground units. Often H&I, or harrassment and interdiction fires were lobbed into the countryside in an effort to disrupt nightime enemy movements.
Instead of sealing off the borders of South Vietnam and cutting the Ho Chi Mihn trail with the conventional forces and leaving the interior to the host nation and Special Forces, Westy had our troops on a constant wild goose chase. This left the borders open and alienated the entire population of South Vietnam because no village or farm was free from the destruction brought on by U.S. weapons. Add to this the fact that U.S. leaders discounted the effects of the civil affairs work done in the countryside to address the concerns of the locals. Our leadership also discounted human intel in the form of spy networks in favor of overhead photos by sat and U2 spyplane, signal intel and captured enemy personel.
Gen. Westmoreland tried to fight a geurilla war with conventional infantry, conventional weapons, conventional tactics and strategy and conventional military thinking.
Other than the initial invasion phase of the war in Iraq, we are fighting the war in nearly the same manner as we did in Vietnam. We have large infantry and armor units on constant patrol in both the major cities as well as the countryside. Whenever enemy fighters are detected larger units pile on and every component of our firepower is brought in. Meanwhile the border areas are not secure and foreign fighters can cross the frontiers at will. Many of Al Zirquawi's recruits infiltrate from western Syria and once in the country can move freely with the aid of the guerilla auxillary.
As far as tactics and overall strategy are concerned, we are in the process of making the same mistakes in Iraq as we did in Vietnam. If I were a General and I was the man in charge, this is what I would do:
1. Re-deploy all infantry, armor and artillery units to the border areas leaving behind small SF, Ranger, selected light infantry and MP units. Seal off the borders and use whatever firepower is needed in the hinterlands to stop fighters from infiltrating the country. The smaller more mobile units would be used to conduct raids, ambushes, and similar actions to fight any enemy forces that mass in the cities or the interior of the country.
2. Train as many U.S. pax as possible in the use of the local languages and infiltrate the mosques and religious organizations in Iraq as well as Syria and Iran if possible. U2 intel is never as good as a man on the ground.
3. Bug/wiretap or place under surveillance every Mosque suspected of subversive activity. When enough evidence of criminal or militant activity is gathered, conduct a raid and hold a VERY speedy trial of those arrested, including any religious leaders.
4. Use the Civil Affairs troops and PSYOPS to do the job of pacification like they should be. The reconstruction of Iraq has taken a back seat to building huge compounds for our troops and barriers/bunkers to protect them. Is it any wonder that some Iraqi's are suspicious of our long term intentions? We need to put the infrastructure of Iraq back together and build up the country, because when the locals see this happening, minds begin to change and the bad guys start to lose support.IMHO, both were horrible but unavoidable in that war. We saw every man, woman and child in Japan as a possible enemy combatant that we had to eliminate. The battle for Okinawa and the suicidal nature of not only the Kamikaze’s, but the civilian inhabitants as well, forced us to rethink what the populatin of mainland Japan would do if we invaded.
If the U.S. forces had invaded mainland Japan , you can bet your bottom dollar that every civilian over the age of 8 would have been enlisted into the Impereal Japanese Army as a resistance fighter. Nuked, firebombed, or shot with an M-1 Garand, we would have been forced to kill them one way or another. We should all thank God that it ended when it did.Although the mistakes made by Germany during the war were legion, my studies of military history and tactics leads me to the following conclusions. Numbers 1 and 2 may be changed in their order depending on your opinion of whether they should be numbered according to importance or chronologically.
1. The invasion of Russia (Operation Barbarosa) and the brutalization of the slavs. Hitlers decision to attack Russia came partially because of his hatred for the slavs, but I believe he had a more important and tactical reason for the timing of Operation Barbarosa. During the 1930's, Stalin had purged the Soviet military of anyone he suspected of disloyalty. This included a large portion of the Army General staff as well as many officers down to the company commander level (Captain). Nearly 1/3 of all officers in the Soviet army were purged and in effect, this left the army in a leaderless state until it could be filled again with new officers chosen from the ranks, or from those of known loyalties as party members. Hitler saw Stalin's purges in 1939 as a great opportunity to catch the Russians in a weakened state. The initial stages of the invasion were an overwhelming success for Germany and many slavs hailed the Germans as liberators. I'm convinced that most if not all of the peoples of eastern Russia would have joined the Germans in fighting against the Soviets, but the Nazi's would have none of it. Soon after the invasion was underway, the SS units began the brutal slaughter of the slavs and things behind the lines turned from a warm welcome to deadly hostility. This tied down untold numbers of German units gaurding the supply trains a pipelines, not to mention robbing Germany of millions of potential soldiers.
To sum it up, if the Germans had not attacked Russia, but instead concentrated all of their military power against Britain and defeated them, they would have been the masters of western Europe.
2. The German failure to knock Britain out of the war before opening the second front. This can be summed up in one word: Radar. Herman Goering underestimated the new weapon that England had at it's disposal during the battle of Britain. Every assault from the air against Britain could be seen far enough ahead to launch co-ordinated groups of fighter aircraft to thwart it. Without radar, Britain would not have been able to patrol the channel and bring effective resistance against the German air forces. They would have simply been strung out trying to find where the Germans would attack next. Radar gave them the advantage and allowed them to mass forces against the German bomber groups. By the time Goering figured out how the Brit's knew where and when they were coming, and started to attack the coastal radar stations, Germany had suffered great losses in both men and aircraft, and Hitler no longer had any confidence in Goerings abilities.
3. The tactics used during the battles of Kursk and Stalingrad. The tactics that had been so successful in the west (speed, surprise, maneuver, flanking and bypass) were thrown away in favor of a frontal assault against prepared Soviet positions. The result was predictable. Any bright military thinker would have given orders to maneuver around the Kursk pocket and to move around to the rear and overtake the supply lines to the rear of the Soviet units. The Luftwaffe could have been turned loose to smoke any Russian units that remained in the pocket while the German armor moved around and penetrated deeper into Soviet territory. This would have made the massive expendature of men and materials by the Soviets at Kursk a waste.
The Germans had several weapons they refered to as the Lufpresbombs, or an early Fuel Air explosives. In effect it would have worked like our new MOAB, or Daisy cutters. Several dozen Luftwaffe bombers loaded with these would have turned the Kursk pocket into a Russian graveyard. Ditto for Stalingrad.
4. The German failure to capture the oil feilds in the Caucasus, Azerbaijan and Iran/Iraq. The decision to turn north and mass their forces around Moskow and Stalingrad instead of turning south and capturing the oilfeilds was a critical mistake. In the early years of the war, Germany had a strategic reserve of oil, gas and of course large coal reserves on it's own soil, but as the war dragged on, Germanys energy resources were cut off by the Allies. Factory production slowed and fuel supplies for the military became scarce. Many units ground to a halt near the end of the war and animal transport was used in an attempt to make up for the shortfall.
