Forum Replies Created
-
Posts
-
If this guy is criticized for this, shouldn't all actors from Hollywood who portray Nazis be criticized as well?
Actors are paid for their portrayals.However, kind of hard to have a WWII re-enactments without re-enactors on both sides, ya know?
Try using that when the cop stops you in the HOV lane!Can you imagine… “When you ride alone, you ride with Osama bin Laden”?
That is the curse of the American Military; we always plan for the last war.
Several years ago I read Defeat Into Victory by Field Marshall Slim (a fantastic, if somewhat pedantic work) and that is one of the things that stuck with me. After the war Slim (and several of his peers) were vilified in the press and before Parliament exactly for that – preparing for the last war and not the next one. Slim's reply was that it was an easy jibe for a MP to make when they had been preparing for no war at all.I guess that where my thoughts are going as I read through Summers' book is that we are again developing a reactive strategy — that our doctrine is being shaped by technology instead of technology being shaped by strategy. Then I read the excerpts from Bob Woodward's book and how the President and the Cabinet are shaping strategy (as they should) but the response of the military leadership is somewhat lacking. “Victory” does not seem to be addressed in our current strategy. Our leaders talk of stability operations, peace keeping, nation building, and withdrawal…. But where is there discussion of victory conditions? Where are the National Policy goals and success conditions / criteria?Food for thought.
I'd like to see a well done, big budget and reasonably accurate movie on Hannibal (the Carthiginian, not the cannibal)
The next question is how long can this state of affairs last? I would guess that within twenty years the US will have faded away to a backwater power such as Britain is today. China and India are the next two Great Powers. They are also located such that they are bound to come into conflict with each other over regional issues. Don?t forget Pakistan as well. There are plenty of areas where china and India can come into conflict, most notably in the Himalayas and trade or trade opportunities. China is also likely to start a conflict over the Spratleys dispute especially if the rumors are true that there is oil near those islands.
I think it'll take much more than 20 years for China and India to rise to true “world power” status. I think that they can bluster and pose (much as the U.S. did at the end of the 19th and start of the 20th Centuries – but not necessarily have the power to back it up… and I think it'll take more than 20 years for the U.S. to fade.I think the crux of the argument is the definition of “conventional” warfare. Warfare evolves constantly and what is accepted as “conventional” changes as well. It hasn't been that long since bombing civilian population centers into rubble was a key component of “conventional” warfare, and now fire bombing a modern city is anathema to what we would consider modern conventional warfare. Two hundred years ago, “conventional” warfare allowed a commander to surrender his unit under the courtesy the honors of war after he had made enough of a show of resistance in the face of the enemy – he could march his force off with their arms, flags, honor, and one cannon with a promise not to fight again.I think that one key issue is that the author, Bacevich, equates “victory” with “conquering”. In the modern wars that he has mentioned, I don't believe that the political or diplomatic goals were to conquer the enemy nation – but instead to restore a status quo or attain some other limited objective. The goal of “Gulf War One” wasn't to defeat Saddam Hussein or conquer Iraq – the goal was to liberate Kuwait. Now, whether that was the right goal or not is open to debate – but that would more appropriately fall under an essay of “The End of Diplomatic History” or perhaps “The End of Effective Political Foreign Policy” or perhaps most accurately “The End of Political Resolve in Foreign Policy”.War is, as Clauswitz said, is a political instrument. It is the extension of policy by other means (other than diplomatic or economic). The combined horrors of the two world wars of the first half of the 20th Century – as well as the dawning of the nuclear age – have tempered the leaders of the industrialized nations to avoid decisive conflict. Yet this avoidance of decisive conflict hasn't negated the role of “conventional” war. There have been plenty of “small wars” where infantry, artillery, armor, naval, and air assets have been employed (and employed effectively, given the limited objectives of the conflicts).Pundits have always been willing to trumpet the end of warfare or the end of the relevance of power. Those of more sound mind and realistic outlook manage to keep things in perspective. It has been 65 years since the end of the last truly decisive global conflict — and yet that conflict wasn't all that decisive as it ended with the dawn of the cold war between the West and the Soviet Union. Sixty-five years. Sure, there have been numerous “small wars” and regional conflicts. But keep in mind that it was almost 90 years between Napoleon's last gasp on the Continent and the outbreak of the First World War. Sure, there were numerous small wars and regional conflicts in between and many of them were not decisive. I'd also contend that the “conventional” war of World War I evolved beyond recognition from the conventional war of Napoleon and Wellington.I think the issue in our limited objective wars are as follows:1. The battle between isolationism and expansionism/imperialism that has raged in American government for over 200 years is still a vibrant as ever.2. Out goverment is increasingly being led by dilettantes and amateurs.3. Our National Command Authority and our executive military leaders have become ideologically bankrupt – we are drawn in too many different directions, and the ship is being steered by industry and dollars. 4. We've become too “tech-heavy” in our military strategy and doctrinal development. By that I mean that our military procurement efforts are driving doctrinal development when it should be the other way around. We should examine the wars and missions that our military anticipates fighting in the next 10 – 20 – 30 and 50 years and develop doctrine that will enable us to accomplish those missions and win those wars. Then that doctrine should drive tehcnological development and procurement. In reality, we develop some cool new technology and develop doctrine around the technology. Likewise, Congress and the Pentagon procure high dollar weapons systems not based on doctrinal or strategic needs, but based on whose congressional districts they are built in. Look at the JSF, the most recent tanker/refueling aircraft, or even the MV-22 Osprey – each in turn is manufactured and assembled from plants across the country. I think I read somewhere that the Osprey was constructed in something like 150 congressional districts. Then there are frequent news stories of Congress authorizing “X” numbers of some aircraft or weapons system that the Pentagon says that it doesn't want or need.5. We've lost our stomach for “right & wrong” – our society has enagaged in too much moral relativism. We were bound together as a society 9 years ago, but that resolve has fragmented. Yamamoto's Sleeping Giant was awakened and growled, but was afraid to crush those in it's path.Warfare is evolving, and our adversaries have evolved faster than we have at this point. They recognized their mission and their dilemma and developed a doctrine focused on accomplishing their mission – not based on what tools and weapons they had at their disposal. They analyzed our strengths and weaknesses and developed a strategy and doctrine to effectively attack our weakesses and avoid our strengths (sound like Sun Tzu?) and even turn our strength to their advantage (really sounds like Sun Tzu!).It will take a while, but we will have leaders that will rise to the occasion and reform and transform our doctrine and our National Command Authority relationships. “Conventional” warfare will evolve to meet the needs of nations and of adversaries. Historical perspecitve is needed when we analyze this evolution.
I have no problem with freedom of expression.In this case, I see it as a perfect storm of bad taste, insenstivity, hate, disrepect, intollerance, callousness, provocation, and general “F”-you'ness that has the perverted audacity to wrap itself in the name of the church.If they wanted to do this on the steps of the Capitol, the Pentagon, the White House lawn, in front of the local recruiting office, or in Times Square then I, for one, would be more tolerant. But to select a funeral – especially the funeral of young people where parents, siblings, and often, young children who have lost their father or mother…. and to do it in the name of God….Well, I guess they are having their intended effect. When Fred Phelps or Megan Phelps-Roper or any of their kith or kin pass on, I hope that they get a taste of their own medicine and about 20,000 people show up to protest and pay their (dis)respects.
Another hypothetical scenario…. Let's say that the petition is successful and the casino if blocked once again, and instead of a gambling establishment, the land designated for the construction of a state of the art VA medical center specifically to deal with Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) and rehabilitation of veterans who are learning to deal with prosthetic limbs – modernizing and taking over the role of Walter Reed. Would opposition be a vocal and as successful?My point (admittedly cynical) is how much of the opposition is about the preservation of historical relevance and how much is that being used as a tool by the anti-gambling (or anti-Walmart) activists?
Look at all the pictures of railroad rails wrapped around polls.
Actually, I read someplace that these were referred to as “Sherman's Bowties” — the process was even depicted in an old John Wayne movie – “The Horse Soldiers”
There are a lot of dabblers in military history who are quick to dismiss the importance of logistics, combat support, and combat service support because it isn't as “sexy” or glorious — but they miss the point that it is often the decisive factor.
I guess a lot would depend on exactly where the casino would go in. There are plenty of spaces east of the Route 15 bypass that are within a mile of the boundary of the park. That area has its fair share of hotels, restaurants, and even a big gaudy movie theater.This kind of falls in line with the whole “mosque near ground zero” argument. How close is “too close”? Would the casino be okay if it were within 3 miles of the park boundary? 5 miles? 15 miles? If 3 miles is okay, is 2.9? Seriously, where do we draw the line?Likewise, how about if it was a hospital instead of a casino? A new car dealership? A museum? A government intelligence fusion center? FBI Central Pennsylvania Field Office? Townhouse complex? A mosque? Or worst of all, a Walmart? Could we put a hospital within a mile of the park boundary but Walmart would have to be no closer than 15 miles?Just for a hypothetical discussion, let's say I owned a farm east of the Route 15 bypass and could no longer afford to keep it (taxes and operating expenses outstripping income). Should the Sons of Confederate Veterans or Civil War Preservation Trust (or some other historical conservation group) be able to prevent me from selling my property to a commercial developer (assuming that the area was zoned appropriately)? Should they have the influence to determine that I had to take an offer from someone else for significantly less money? Yes, building a casino in the shadow of the Gettysburg battlefield is in poor taste (as is the mosque a couple of blocks from ground zero in NYC), but where do we draw the line in balancing bad taste with individual freedoms?
You just got the latest edition of the Journal of Military history didn't you? I recently read an article in there that discussed this very topic.
No, I just finished reading Edward Hagerman's The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command and that is one point that really stood out to me – especially where he started describing the number of box car loads of fodder that were necessary to keep the animals in fighting shape.
