Scout ? we may just have to agree to disagree on this one.I?m not saying that the Soviet performance in the December 41 counter-offensive was anywhere near masterful.  My point was that, while the first two months of the Russo-Finnish ?Winter War? was an embarrassing disaster for the Soviets, the last two months were a foreshadowing of the Red Army that would destroy the bulk of the Wehrmacht in the war of movement that came in 1944 and 45.With the change of command of the Soviet Forces in Finland in January 1940, Timoshenko and Zhukov went into the defensive only long enough to reorganize, concentrate forces, and train.  They improved command and control and trained troops in the coordination of supporting arms, coordination of tank-infantry teams, use of aerial observers to control massed artillery fires (airborne in tethered balloons), and proper coordination of logistics.  They also trained in the basics of winter warfare.  (The December attacks had utilized Ukrainians ? many of whom had never even seen more than a dusting of snow before.)When the offensive was resumed in February 1940, it bore virtually no resemblance to the previous offensive.  The offensive started on 1 February with an average of 80 artillery pieces per mile of front firing the largest barrage since Verdun ? some 300,000 shells in the first 24 hours.  The barrage increased in intensity for eleven days until the main assault was launched. Timoshenko concentrated 35 divisions on the Karelian Isthmus and employed them in succession so that as one was approaching being spent, another took its place.  At the key Viipuri Gateway near the village of Summa the Soviet 7th Army massed nine infantry divisions, five tank brigades, one rifle-machinegun brigade and ten artillery regiments.  The result was an unyielding operational tempo that the Finns could not deal with.  Within about 3 weeks the Finns sought terms.  Estimated (and I stress ?estimated?) Soviet losses for the Winter War are believed to be somewhere between 230,000 to 270,000 killed (to all causes) and probably an additional 200,000 wounded? but the majority of those losses came in the December phase of the campaign.  The official Soviet history of the Winter War describes the Red Army?s losses only as ?excessive and avoidable.?Now, to my point originally ? from 14-17 April 1940 the Supreme Military Soviet met at the Kremlin to review the lessons learned from the Winter War and instituted reforms.  These included restoring enlisted ranks within infantry units (NCOs) to improve command and control among those units doing the fighting; reducing the role of the frontline political commissar from co-commander in order to ensure unity of command; formalized winter tactics, clothing, equipment, and shelter; focus on brigade level over the snow mobility; and procurement of winter lubricants for weapons and vehicles.  The lessons of tank-infantry team coordination instituted by Timoshenko and Zhukov in January 1940 were to be standardized and reinforced across the Red Army.  The doctrine of massing forces at key locations on the battlefield in order to create an escalating operational tempo that their opponents could not match was also to be instituted across the Red Army.  The Soviets also brought back the submachine gun that had fallen into disfavor in the late 1930s (due primarily to the Soviet logistical system?s inability to keep the units supplied with ammunition), based largely on the recognized effectiveness of the Finnish 9mm ?Soumi? submachine gun. Also, it was decided that the ?sport? of cross-country skiing was to be an approved and encouraged activity for the civilian populace.  And this one seems like a ?no-brainer?, but it was recognized that units formed from populations from arctic regions should be the primary force used in winter warfare.Now, obviously these reforms were implemented with standard Soviet bureaucracy and inefficiency.  Stalin, at this point, was still viewing the Red Army with a paranoid eye.  So reform moved at a glacial pace.Now, when the counter-offensive was launched outside of Moscow in December 1940 only a few of these reforms were in effect.  Far from throwing their last trained reserves into the fight, the Soviet Army mustered 56 divisions in reserve.  They were, however, largely thrown piecemeal into the battle, due mainly to the desperate situation.  Nonetheless, the Soviets did employ up to brigade sized ski units (some effectively, some ineffectively).  Unlike those divisions that stormed across the Finnish frontier two years earlier, these units wore winter uniforms, including felt foot wraps, and had lubricants on their weapons that functioned much better than the German weapons in the severe cold.  The counter-offensive pushed the Germans back between 50 and 150 miles before they were spent.  The Soviet logistical and command and control system had not matured that much, and when the first signs of success started to show, Stalin intervened and diluted the effort.Another interesting note to some of the reforms that had taken place in the intervening years between 1939 and 1941 is to look at the non-combat casualty lists.  Outside of Moscow, the Germans suffered some 100,000 frostbite casualties by the end of December ? some 14% of which required amputation.  (Guderian reported losing twice as many men to frost as to enemy action.) By the end of the winter, that number had climbed to over 250,000.  In the Red Army at the same time, frostbite was a punishable offense ? so the number of reported cases were insignificant in comparison.  (Notice, I say ?reported? cases, no doubt many went unreported).What I?m suggesting here is that the Red Army that launched Operation Mars and Uranus in the winter of 1942 and later pushed the Wehrmacht out of Russia and back into Germany had it?s operational roots in the Red Army that stormed the Karelian Isthmus in late February and March 1940. If Timoshenko and Zhukov had not had the opportunity to start to "fix what was broken" in the Winter War and start to get those reforms recognized in the Kremlin, then who knows when these reforms would have started and when they would have an effect against the Wehrmacht.

Scout 1067 — you'll enjoy that class, I took it last year.You mention the Russo-Finnish Winter War 1939-1940.  While December 1939 showed Soviet incompetence, don't ignore February-March 1940 when Chief of Staff Shaposhnikov reorganized the Leningrad Military District into the Northwestern Front and put the Soviet operations in Finland under Timoshenko's leadership.  Timoshenko brought in Georgi Zhukov as his chief of staff and halted all operations in Finland in order to reorganize, re-train, and rehearse.  They focused the entire operation on the Karelian Isthmus and attacked with overwhelming force - up to 80 artillery pieces per mile of frontage - and wore the Finns down with an unyielding tempo of operations.Timoshenko's Karelian campaign of February-March 1940 is often ignored in the larger picture of WWII, but the reforms implemented there carried over to the winter campaign of 1941-42.  The Soviets learned many lessons related to fighting a brutal winter war and also shaped their overall offensive doctrine that would become apparent two and a half years later.Yes, the Finns taught the Russians a hard, hard lesson in the early phase of the Winter War, not just at Suomussalmi but across the entire Finnish frontier.  The Western World snickered under their breath at the demonstrated Soviet incompetence, and it may have contributed to Hitler's decision to launch Barbarossa -- but he was already planning the operation and may well have attacked when he did because he knew (or believed) that if he didn't, then Stalin would attack him in the coming year or two once his military reforms were complete.  If you examine the record, you will find that the Soviets studied these lessons in April 1940 and initiated broad reforms.  The bureaucracy and inefficiency of the Soviet system prevented wide spread progress, but you can see those same lessons and reforms applied to the Soviet counter-offensive starting in early December 1941 outside of Moscow.Soviet recovery from their demonstrated incompetence began in January 1940, was demonstrated in February in Finland, and was formalized in April 1940.  If it hadn't begun until after Barbarossa had begun, I believe that the counter-offensive outside Moscow would have been unlikely.

I've used several of those above – especially the Avalon Project.One of my favorites, and extensively used, is the World War II site "The Hyperwar Project":  http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/ - mostly source documents and primary/official histories.

I'd have to rank ZULU a little higher than 7th… especially since it was the inspiration for a couple ranked above it.Also, there were some good battle sequences in Clint Eastwood's two Iwo Jima movies.

I'm all in favor of GOOD historical fiction — provided it's recognized as such.  GOOD historical fiction opens the door of historical events for people who otherwise might not have been exposed to it, and it can be a catalyst for further historical study.Since we're not supposed to cite specific examples, I'll stick with authors - people such as Michael and Jeff Shaara, Steven Pressfield, and David L. Robbins.  IMHO these are some guys who "get" historical fiction, and by and large, produce GOOD historical fiction.Then there's BAD historical fiction -- I think we've all seen plenty of that -- and it should be classified solely as FICTION - or for that matter "BAD FICTION".

But for me it's alot of times about the people.

I have to agree with Stumpfoot - it's the people that fascinate me - people thrown into pivotal or adverse conditions and situations, and then how they handle them and what would / could have happened if they were to have thought or acted differently or on a different time table.  A lot of the "what if"s would usually be overwhelmed by future events and momentum, but it's still fascinating to study.I guess it's summed up for me in the quote below my signature -- how ordinary men (and women) handle extraordinary circumstances

Looks like this tread is sliding off the original topic, so I think I?ll push it a little further?When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 he was confident that he could knock Stalin out of the war by the end of the year.  His reasons for launching BARBAROSSA were many, but they included ?living space? for his expanding Reich ? that is for the German people; a ?pre-emptive? strike against future Soviet aggression; increased farm land and natural resources; and an attempt to drive Great Britain to seek peace terms.This last point is worthy of additional discussion ? Hitler was frustrated that Churchill had refused to seek terms.  Operation SEALION was never a serious option.  Hitler didn?t want to conquer Great Britain, but to seek terms so that he could focus his military and economic power elsewhere.  If Britain were defeated, then their empire would collapse and be easy pickings for Hitler?s main rivals.  No doubt the Soviets would move through Persia and Iraq and India.  Japan would fill the British vacuum in the South Pacific and Burma (they ended up taking most of it ? including Singapore) the following year anyway.  Thus, Hitler would have little to gain from the collapse of the British Empire and much to lose.  In 1941 Churchill?s only ally capable of spoiling Hitler?s plans was the Soviet Union.  He believed that a quick victory would convince Churchill to seek terms as the ?lesser? presence in Europe.With that setting, Hitler launched BARBAROSSA in June 1941 with his best and brightest.  When they fell out of favor, such as with Guderian in December 1941, they were relieved and sent back to Germany.As far as Hitler remaining primarily focused on the Eastern Front ? this is no doubt due to a couple of reasons, not the least of which is the scale of the front and the scale of the threat.  Other things to consider:- The campaigns of 1941-42 in Russia had been a war of annihilation.  While the Ukranians may have seen the Germans initially as liberators from the Godless Soviets, Hitler wanted nothing to do with the Slavs.  They were treated brutally, relocated, or annihilated.  - In 1944-45, the advancing Soviets were returning the favor.  As mentioned before, defeat at the hands of the Soviets would be brutal and/or fatal.  Defeat at the hands of the British or Americans (or more properly, the Western Allies) promised more human treatment (usually).- In the summer of 1941, Hitler had moved his field headquarters to be closer to the Soviet front.  His trips back to Berlin were infrequent and of relatively short duration, especially after he took over a commander in chief.- Strategic bombers flying from Great Britain were taking quite a heavy toll on German industry and communications.  It was ?easier? to slow the Soviets and hold them back than it was to slow the aerial onslaught from airfields in England.

I haven't figured one out for the MSM besides pushing an insane agenda   

That's an easy answer - to sell advertising!  That's what it's all about.